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IN MEMORIAM
On April 19, 2020, 48-year-old 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Constable Heidi Stevenson was 
killed while on duty. She was 
responding to an active 
shooter incident in Nova 
Scotia where 22 innocent 
people were killed at the 
hands of a gunman. Three 
other people were  also injured, including 
another RCMP officer. 
During the rampage, Constable Stevenson’s 
vehicle collided head on with the gunman’s 
vehicle. She engaged the gunman, but he took 
her life. The gunman also took Constable 
Stevenson’s gun and magazines and set her 
vehicle on fire.  The gunman fled the  scene and 
was later shot and killed by police at a gas 
station.
Constable Stevenson was a 23-year veteran of 
the RCMP. She is survived by her husband and 
two children. 
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news
“Heidi answered the call of duty and lost her 
life while protecting those she served.” 
Assistant Commissioner Lee Bergerman,
 Commanding Officer, Nova Scotia RCMP
~ Constable Heidi Stevenson ~
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Highlights In This Issue
A Person Is Either Detained Or Not Detained 5
Circumstances Justified Ordering Passenger Back In 
Vehicle: Detention Not Arbitrary
7
Handcuffing On Investigative Detention Justified: No 
s. 9 Breach
9
Without Reasonable Suspicion, Investigative 
Detention Arbitrary
12
Grounds For Arrest Considered Differently Than 
Grounds For A Search Warrant
14
Surveillance Observations In Condominium Hallway 
Amounted To A Search
19
Arrest Shy Of Reasonable Grounds Was An 
Arbitrary Detention, But Evidence Admissible
22
Court Used Prior Reported Cases Involving 
Officers In Assessing Reasonable Grounds
29
Psychological Detention Arose When Police Boxed 
In Vehicle So It Could Not Be Driven Away
47
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter. 
Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is March 13, 2020.
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is June 1, 2020.
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Enter the exciting  and growing field of Emergency 
Management with an applied, degree-path 
certificate from Canada’s leading public  safety 
educator. Complete the program entirely online in 
three (3) months! 
Click here for more information.
Note-able Quote
“What you think about is 
what expands.”
~Dr. Wayne Dyer~
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Atomic habits: an easy & proven way to build 
good habits & break bad ones: tiny changes, 
remarkable results.
James Clear.
New York, NY: Avery, an imprint of Penguin Random 
House, 2018.
BF 335 C525 2018
Cognitive-behavioral therapy for PTSD: a case 
formulation approach.
Claudia Zayfert, Carolyn Black Becker.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2020.
RC 552 P67 Z39 2020
Communicate in a crisis: understand, engage and 
influence consumer behaviour to maximize brand 
trust.
Kate Hartley.
London, UK: Kogan Page, 2019.
HD 49.3 H37 2019
Contagious you: unlock your power to influence, 
lead, and create the impact you want.
Anese Cavanaugh.
New York, NY: McGrawHill, 2020.
HD 57.7 C388 2020
Cybercrime: awareness, prevention, and 
response.
Kathy Macdonald.
Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2019.
HV 6773 M33 2019
The cybersecurity playbook: how every leader and 
employee can contribute to a culture of security.
Allison Cerra.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
QA 76.9 A25 C4327 2019
Dis/consent: perspectives on sexual consent and 
sexual violence.
edited by KelleyAnne Malinen.
Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publishing, 2019.
HV 6593 C3 D57 2019
Domestic and family violence: a critical 
introduction to knowledge and practice.
Silke Meyer and Andrew Frost.
London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
HV 6626 M49 2019
How charts lie: getting smarter about visual 
information.
Alberto Cairo.
New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2019.
QA 76.9 I52 C338 2019
How people learn: designing education and training 
that works to improve performance.
Nick Shackleton-Jones.
London, UK: Kogan Page, 2019.
HF 5549.5 T7 S53 2019
Powerful teaching: unleash the science of 
learning.
Pooja K. Agarwal and Patrice M. Bain.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2019.
LB 1062 A36 2019
Tools and weapons: the promise and the peril of 
the digital age.
Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne.
New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2019.
HM 851 S594 2019
Understanding how we learn: a visual guide.
Yana Weinstein & Megan Sumeracki ; with Oliver 
Caviglioli.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
LB 1060 W44 2019
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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A PERSON IS EITHER DETAINED 
or NOT DETAINED
R. v. Ratt, 2020 SKCA 19
Two police officers saw a group of
people fighting at a  street corner. The
officers went to investigate the fight
and, as they arrived on scene, saw a
man running away. One of the officers
yelled at the fleeing man to “stop” and told him he 
was “under arrest”. The officer pursued the man 
and found him hiding behind a propane tank. 
The officer recognized the man as the accused, a 
probationer who was not permitted to be within 25 
kilometres of the location where he was found. The 
accused was arrested for breaching his probation 
order and, while being escorted to the police 
vehicle, allegedly threatened both officers. He was 
placed in the police vehicle, and advised of his 
right to silence and his right to counsel.  He was 
subsequently charged with breaching his probation, 
resisting  a peace officer in the lawful execution of 
his duty “by fleeing arrest” and two counts of 
uttering threats to cause bodily harm.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the accused’s 
ss. 9 and 10(a) Charter rights had been 
breached. The judge found the accused 
had been unlawfully  detained or arrested 
when police yelled at him to “stop” and that he 
was “under arrest”. In her view, the officers did not 
have the necessary reasonable grounds to arrest 
under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code. They were 
acting on a “mere suspicion”  since they did not see 
the accused committing an indictable offence. Nor 
did they have reasonable grounds to believe he had 
committed such an offence. Since there was no 
authority to arrest the accused, his detention was 
arbitrary. The accused was also not promptly 
advised of the reason for his arrest at this time. 
Thus, his s. 10(a) Charter right had been violated. 
All of the evidence pertaining to the events that 
occurred thereafter — the officer’s identification of 
the accused, the  probation breach, his resisting 
arrest and his uttering threats — was excluded 
under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the 
accused’s acquittal arguing, 
among other things, that the 
trial judge erred in holding he 
was actually “detained” under the  Charter  when 
the officer yelled at him to “stop” and that he was 
“under arrest”. Since he had not been actually 
detained at this moment, the Crown contended that 
ss. 9 and 10 were not triggered. 
The accused, on the other hand, submitted that the 
trial judge properly found he  was detained when 
the officers yelled at him, even though the 
detention was only momentary and fleeting.
Was the Accused Detained?
Justice Ryan-Froslie, delivering the opinion for the 
unanimous Court of Appeal, first reviewed the 
“subtle, though distinct, difference between 
effecting an arrest and a detention”: 
An arrest can only occur if (i) there is an 
actual seizure or touching of a person’s 
body with a view to detention; or (ii) in 
the absence of a seizure or touching, the 
person submits to the process of arrest. 
Merely stating “you’re under arrest” is 
not sufficient to effect an arrest unless 
the person submits to the process and 
goes with the arresting officer. 
On the other hand, where a peace 
officer makes a demand or gives a 
Charter of Rights
s. 9 Everyone has the right not
to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned.
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direction to a person, that person is detained 
“where he or she ‘submits or acquiesces in the 
deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes 
that the choice to do otherwise does not 
exist’.” [references omitted, paras. 21-22]
And further:
Unless an individual is physically “seized”, a 
detention requires submission or acquiescence 
to a police direction or demand, coupled with 
circumstances in which a reasonable person 
would understand that there was no choice but 
to comply. The submission or acquiescence can 
be extremely brief and immediately followed 
by flight. [para. 36]
In this case, Justice Ryan-Froslie  concluded there 
was no arrest. The officers never “seized” or 
touched the accused, nor did he submit to arrest, 
before he was found behind the propane tank. 
As for a  detention, there was none. First, there was 
no physical restraint. Second, although the officer’s 
command to “stop” because he was “under arrest” 
was a police demand, the  accused “did not submit 
or acquiesce — even briefly — to the peace 
officer’s commands.”  Here, the  accused was 
already running away when the officers got out of 
their police vehicle and issued commands at him. 
Since he did not submit or acquiesce  to these 
demands, there was no detention. Without a 
detention, there was no need to proceed to the 
second stage of the analysis — determining 
arbitrariness.
“Before there can be an arbitrary detention within 
the meaning of s. 9 of the Charter, there must first 
be a detention,” said Justice Ryan-Froslie. “An 
attempted detention is not a detention for the 
purposes of s. 9.” Since a violation of both s. 9 and 
s. 10(a)  depended upon a proper finding of
detention, which the  trial judge erred in deciding, 
the Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal on the  charges was set aside and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Whether or not there were other Charter breaches 
related to the accused’s actual arrest behind the 
propane tank remained an open question to be 
answered at the new trial.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Unless an individual is physically ‘seized’, a detention requires submission or 
acquiescence to a police direction or demand, coupled with circumstances in which 
a reasonable person would understand that there was no choice but to comply. 
The submission or acquiescence can be extremely brief and immediately followed 
by flight.”
“Before there can be an arbitrary 
detention within the meaning of s. 9 of 
the Charter, there must first be a 
detention. An attempted detention is 
not a detention for the purposes of s. 9.” 
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CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED 
ORDERING PASSENGER 
BACK IN VEHICLE: 
DETENTION NOT ARBITRARY
R. v. Slippery, 2020 SKCA 23
At 11:50 p.m. a police officer on
patrol pulled a  vehicle over in a
routine stop under Saskatchewan’s
Traffic Safety  Act. While calling in the
stop, the officer noticed the vehicle’s
front seat passenger door open and then quickly 
close. This action raised a safety concern for the 
officer and he called for backup. As backup arrived, 
the passenger (accused) got out of the vehicle and 
stood by the passenger side with the door open. 
The officer shouted at him to get back into the car, 
which he  did. There were also two other passengers 
in the back seat.
The officer approached the driver’s side of the car 
and asked the driver for his licence and registration. 
The accused — a passenger — was also asked for 
his name and birthdate. He provided a name that 
was later determined to be false after a CPIC query 
did not produce any results. The driver was arrested 
after police learned he was bound by an 
undertaking and could only operate a motor 
vehicle if the registered owner was in it. The officer 
took the driver to the police vehicle, and returned 
to the accused, who was now standing outside the 
car with a backup officer. As he walked around the 
car, the officer saw a firearm — which he had not 
noticed before — inside the  car on the floor just in 
front of the passenger seat. 
The officer arrested the accused for possessing the 
firearm, handcuffed him and laid him on the 
sidewalk. He was then turned over to another 
officer. The accused later spoke to a lawyer at the 
police station. The firearm was a loaded, sawed-off 
rifle with a round in the chamber and four or five 
rounds in its magazine. Police also found drugs 
under the seat and a radio belonging to the City of 
Regina in the back seat. The accused was charged 
with various criminal offences. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The arresting officer testified that, in his 
experience, the passenger’s action of 
opening  the door raised an officer safety 
issue. Doors open when people are 
fleeing from a vehicle or fleeing from a criminal 
offence. The officer said that most people do not get 
out of a vehicle on their own.  He testified he did 
not intend to allow any of the occupants in the 
vehicle to get out based on his safety concerns. He 
said that he  would do the same whenever he made 
a traffic  stop until he felt it was safe  to approach the 
vehicle and assess the situation. A backup officer 
confirmed that all occupants of a vehicle would be 
kept inside it for officer safety  reasons because the 
police would have no information about the people 
in the car. 
The accused sought the exclusion of the firearm, 
the drugs and the radio as evidence under s. 24(2) 
of the Charter. In his view, his rights under ss. 8, 9 
and 10(b) of the Charter had been violated. 
The judge concluded that the accused had been 
detained when the officer ordered him to get back 
in the car. “When one considers the definition of 
‘detention’ ... , it seems clear that when the 
accused was instructed to get back into the 
vehicle, he was detained,”  said the judge. “It is 
hard to imagine that any reasonable person would 
feel they had the right to walk away when shouted 
at by  a police officer to get into a vehicle.”  
However, the judge found this detention was not 
arbitrary. It was a lawful exercise of police powers 
in the circumstances for “officer safety” purposes:
In the present case two experienced police 
officers testified that it is unusual for a 
passenger to attempt to exit a vehicle stopped 
for a routine traffic stop.  Defence counsel 
submits this is just a hunch on the part of the 
officers that the persons in the vehicle may be 
involved in some criminal activity. In my view, 
the officers’ evidence established that the 
behaviour, based on their experience, gave rise 
to a reasonable concern that officer safety may 
be at risk.  This is more than a hunch; it is an 
objective assessment of the situation based on 
past experience.
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[The arresting officer] was lawfully in the 
execution of his duty in stopping the vehicle 
and he was entitled to ensure there was no 
danger to him from any of the occupants in the 
vehicle.  A routine traffic stop can be fraught 
with danger for police officers.  They have no 
way of knowing who is in the vehicle, how 
many persons are in the vehicle or if there are 
any weapons in the vehicle.  Despite the fact 
that there was no evidence presented about the 
training police receive regarding traffic stops, I 
am prepared to accept the evidence of the two 
officers that at least at the commencement of a 
traffic stop it is necessary for police safety to 
keep the occupants of the vehicle in the vehicle 
while the issue of their safety and public safety 
is investigated. ... [see R. v. Slippery, 2019 
SKPC 5, paras. 28-29]
Next, the judge  proceeded on the assumption that 
the officer was not entitled to demand the accused 
identify  himself and therefore assumed the demand 
for his name and date of birth was an unreasonable 
search. However, the judge concluded the accused 
had no standing  to argue the search of the vehicle, 
which resulted in the seizure of the firearm, drugs 
and radio, was unreasonable. In the judge’s 
view,  the accused failed to establish he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
The vehicle  belonged to the driver’s wife’s 
grandmother and the driver was simply giving the 
accused and the two other passengers a ride, 
having only  met them that day. Further, once the 
accused was out of the vehicle, the officer clearly 
saw the firearm on the floor of the vehicle in front 
of the passenger seat rendering it in plain view and 
subject to a warrantless seizure. A further search of 
the vehicle was lawful. 
As for s. 10(a) of the Charter, the judge found the 
accused should have been told of the reason for his 
detention when the officer told him to get back into 
the vehicle. The officer could have told the accused 
that he was being detained in the vehicle  for officer 
safety reasons and that it would be brief while he 
checked the driver’s licence and vehicle 
registration. As for s. 10(b), there was no breach 
since it would have been impractical for the officer 
to give the accused his right to counsel at that 
point.  Once the  firearm was observed, the accused 
was immediately arrested and was provided his s. 
10(b) caution. 
The judge found the firearm, drugs and radio were 
not obtained in a manner that breached the 
accused’s rights under s. 8 (the request to provide 
his name and date  of birth) or s. 10(a) (not being 
informed promptly of the reason for detention). The 
accused’s request for exclusion was denied and 
this evidence was admissible. Had she been asked 
to do so, the judge would have excluded the 
evidence of the accused providing the false name 
and date  of birth to police under a  s. 24(2) since it 
was obtained in breach of the Charter. However, 
the accused was never charged with providing the 
police with a false name. The accused was 
convicted of possessing a loaded firearm, 
possessing a firearm for a  dangerous purpose, 
transporting a  firearm in a careless manner and four 
counts of breaching an undertaking. He was 
sentenced to five years in prison, less pre-sentence 
credit. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the  trial judge 
had misinterpreted the law 
when she stated, “at least at the 
commencement of a  traffic stop it is necessary for 
police  safety to keep the occupants of the vehicle 
in the vehicle while the issue of their safety and 
public safety is investigated”  (see para. 29 above) 
The Crown accepted that the trial judge overstated 
the law, but submitted the error had no impact on 
her decision to admit the firearm as evidence in the 
circumstances of this case. Furthermore, the Crown 
asserted that the trial judge erred in finding a s. 8 
breach when the officer asked the accused to 
identify himself.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s 
challenge to his convictions. Despite the trial 
judge’s overstatement about the necessity of the 
police routinely keeping all occupants in a vehicle 
while they investigated police safety, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the trial judge did not err in 
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determining there was no s. 9 breach in this case. 
The trial judge found the two experienced police 
officers conducted an objective assessment of the 
accused’s behaviour, which gave rise to a 
reasonable concern that officer safety may be at 
risk (see para. 28 above). The officers were not 
acting on a hunch. 
Moreover, the  accused was detained only briefly 
before the firearm was discovered in plain view. 
Even if there was a s. 9 breach, the Court of Appeal 
was of the view there was no basis to interfere with 
the trial judge’s s. 24(2) ruling. 
Furthermore, the trial judge did not decide whether 
a demand for identification constituted a s. 8 
breach. Instead, she merely assumed a breach and 
then considered whether the breaches warranted 
the exclusion of the firearm. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Slippery, 2019 SKPC 005.
HANDCUFFING ON 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
JUSTIFIED: NO s. 9 BREACH
R. v. Upright, 2020 ABCA 122
Just after midnight, police officers
surveilled a Ford Explorer, including 
the use  of a police helicopter. The 
Explorer was at a  residential address 
associated with a man wanted on 46 
outstanding warrants. The police had information 
that the man had access to firearms and had 
recently escaped police custody while carrying a 
handgun. They considered him a  high risk to police 
and public safety, highly motivated to avoid arrest 
and possibly armed with a handgun. 
While being surveilled, the Explorer was seen to 
make three separate  stops in three different parking 
lots.  At the first two stops a person was seen to 
enter and exit the Explorer using the rear passenger 
doors. At the third stop, the Explorer and a second 
vehicle stopped at a  MacDonald’s restaurant with 
their driver’s side  doors next to each other.  The 
drivers of the two vehicles were seen to 
interact.  An officer saw the driver of the Explorer 
through its open driver’s side window and 
identified him as the wanted man.
Police attempted a high risk  traffic stop, but the 
Explorer did not stop and accelerated away at high 
speed. Police did not pursue but surveillance 
continued by  helicopter. When the Explorer’s route 
became predictable, officers were  able to stop the 
vehicle after deploying a spike belt. Two persons — 
the driver and a passenger — ran from the vehicle.  
Though they ran in somewhat different directions, 
police believed they reunited in a convenience 
store at one end of a strip mall near where the 
Explorer had stopped. When the man and the 
accused exited the convenience store together and 
walked toward a pizza restaurant at the  other end 
of the strip mall, an officer approached them. The 
officers asked them to go into the pizza restaurant 
and stay there while  police continued their initial 
investigation.  The two entered the restaurant and 
sat on a bench in the restaurant’s foyer. A police 
dog was deployed and followed a track from the 
driver’s side of the stopped Explorer to the pizza 
restaurant.
While in the restaurant, an officer identified the 
man and arrested him. The accused was detained 
for investigative purposes — possession of a 
weapon — and she was handcuffed.  Her purse, 
which was already open and either on her lap or 
within her reach, was searched. Police saw two 
plastic baggies at the  top of the  purse believed to 
contain crystal methamphetamine. The accused 
was arrested for possessing methamphetamine for 
the purpose of trafficking, advised or her rights and 
patted down. She was transported to the police 
station where she was strip searched, but nothing 
more was found. A more detailed search of her 
purse at the police station revealed further 
evidence including more drugs, cellphones, 
identification, score sheets and cash. The accused 
was charged with several offences including four 
counts of possessing a controlled substance for the 
purposes of trafficking — methamphetamine, 
diazepam, cocaine and heroin — and possessing 
proceeds of crime.
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Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified he  detained the 
accused because he believed both 
persons fleeing the Explorer had not left 
the area. He also believed the accused 
had been its second occupant and there was 
potential that the male  was in possession of a 
firearm. “I detained her and told her she was being 
detained for possession of a  weapon. . . . So it 
stood to reason for me that if  one person had a 
firearm that this other person, I guess, regardless 
of whether she was even in the vehicle, she’s with 
him now, could have said firearm or any  other 
weapon with her or in her purse,”  said the officer. 
“So that was the reason for my detention, to 
further investigate that.” 
As for handcuffing  her, the officer said he did so 
“primarily for safety reasons. This was, like I said, 
a high risk event.   Had she — had anyone else in 
that vehicle — had the vehicle stopped, they all 
would have been handcuffed for safety.  For our 
safety  and for the public’s safety.”  The officer 
explained the practice  of placing detainees in 
handcuffs where weapons were  potentially 
involved or where there was risk  of flight. He then 
said he searched the accused’s purse for safety 
purposes. He was aware the male  was potentially 
in possession of a firearm and, since the accused 
was with him, the firearm could have transferred 
hands. 
Finally, the strip search was conducted because of 
the nature of the charges and the accused’s history 
of drug trafficking. She was also with a person 
involved with firearms and it was “likely very 
probable” the accused would be held in close 
quarters to other people who had been arrested. 
The accused argued that handcuffing  her was a 
breach of her right to be free from arbitrary 
detention and the that search of her purse was 
unreasonable. She also argued that the later strip 
search at the police station infringed her s. 8 
Charter right to be secure  against unreasonable 
search. She sought the exclusion of the evidence 
under s. 24(2) or a  stay of proceedings under s. 
24(1). But the judge disagreed and found no 
Charter infringements. 
First, the judge concluded that the  accused had not 
been arbitrarily detained in breach of s. 9. He 
found the officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
detain her. Moreover, placing  her in handcuffs was 
also reasonable. “The ... reasonable belief that [the 
accused] could be armed and therefore that she 
possibly  posed a significant safety concern to both 
the police and the public, and the concern, given 
the reasonable belief that she had fled from the 
Explorer when it was stopped and was therefore a 
flight risk, justified restraining her with handcuffs 
while further investigative measures were taken,” 
said the judge. “In my view, in the circumstances, 
the intrusion on [the accused’s] liberty was no 
more than reasonably  necessary to address 
reasonably perceived risks.”
Second, there was no s. 8 breach in relation to the 
warrantless search of the  accused’s purse. The same 
reasons for detaining her provided the reasons for 
searching her purse — it might contain a firearm. 
“Given the reasonable belief that [the accused] 
might be in possession of a firearm and that if she 
was, the most likely location of the firearm was in 
the purse, it was reasonable for [the officer] to 
search the purse to ensure officer and public 
safety,” said the judge.  “In the circumstances, a 
warrantless pat down search of [the accused’s] 
person was clearly reasonable.  It was reasonable 
to eliminate the possibility that she had a firearm 
hidden in her clothing.  It was, in my view, equally 
reasonable and justified to perform a warrantless 
search of her purse to eliminate the possibility  that 
it contained a firearm.”
Third, in the  judge’s view, the strip search was 
conducted to ensure the safety of the accused 
being detained in custody, and other detainees and 
police officers in the lockup, more than it was to 
discover and preserve evidence. “The concern that 
she might have a weapon or drugs hidden on her 
body arose from the circumstances surrounding 
her arrest and gave rise to the conclusion that she 
should be strip searched before being placed in 
the police lockup or remand custody,”  said the 
judge in holding there was sufficient justification in 
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the circumstances for conducting the strip search.  
The strip search was also conducted in a 
reasonable manner. 
Since there  was no breach of the  accused’s Charter 
rights resulting from her brief detention in 
handcuffs prior to her arrest, nor any Charter 
violations as a result of either the search of her 
purse or the strip search of her person at the police 
station, the evidence was admitted. The accused 
was convicted of simple possession of cocaine, 
possessing heroin, methamphetamine and 
Diazepam for the purpose of trafficking, and 
possessing proceeds of crime ($450 cash). She was 
sentenced to five years in prison less 11 months 
pre-trial custody for a remaining sentence of four 
years and one month. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
Although she conceded her 
detention was justified, the 
accused argued handcuffing her 
breached s. 9 of the Charter — 
the right to be free from arbitrary detention. 
She also contended the search of her purse and 
later strip search at the police station violated her s. 
8 Charter  right to be secure against unreasonable 
search. She wanted the evidence, including the 
drugs and trafficking paraphernalia found in her 
purse, ruled inadmissible as evidence. 
Handcuffing on Detention
The accused challenged the 
use of handcuffs suggesting the 
police had an obligation to use 
the least restrictive method of 
de tent ion. The Cour t o f 
Appeal, however, found the 
trial judge did not err in 
concluding  the accused had 
demonstrated she was a  flight 
risk and therefore the use of 
handcuffs was justified. 
Purse Search on Detention
As for the search of her purse, the Court of Appeal 
noted that the trial judge found there was reason to 
believe the accused may have been armed and 
therefore posed a potential safety threat to both the 
police and the public. “One of the arresting 
officers testified that the [accused’s] purse was 
either on her lap or within her reach,” said the 
Appeal Court. “The trial judge found that the 
police  had reason to believe that the [accused] was 
armed and if she was, the most likely place for a 
gun would be in her purse. The trial judge found 
that the risk of the presence of a firearm and the 
belief that safety was at stake provided the police 
with a sufficient basis to conduct a ‘safety search’ 
of the purse  ... . On those findings by the trial 
judge, no Charter breach is disclosed.” This was 
not a case where the police did not subjectively 
believe safety was at stake when the search was 
performed nor one that was not objectively 
justified. Rather, the accused “was sitting right next 
to the purse suspected of containing a  gun.” The 
search of the purse did not infringe s. 8.
Strip Search at the Police Station
Here, the the trial judge found the accused was 
strip searched for the safety of the accused and 
other persons in custody. “There was a reasonable 
concern that the [accused] might have drugs or 
weapons on her body or in her clothing,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “The trial judge found that there 
were reasonable grounds to conduct the strip 
search, which was done substantially in 
accordance with the guidelines in R. v. Golden, 
2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 SCR 679. These findings 
were all justified on the record.” The strip search 
did not breach s. 8.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Editor’s note: Additional details obtained from R. v. 
Upright, 2018 ABQB 490, R. v. Upright, 2018 
ABQB 944 and R. v. Upright, 2019 ABQB 14.
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WITHOUT REASONABLE 
SUSPICION INVESTIGATIVE 
DETENTION ARBITRARY
R. v. Sanscartier, 2019 QCCA 1079
While conducting a drug trafficking 
invest igat ion, which included 
surveillance, the police suspected the 
accused of supplying narcotics for 
sale in New Brunswick. A New 
Brunswick judge subsequently authorized a search 
warrant for the accused’s Quebec residence after he 
had been seen in the company of two people who 
were arrested in New Brunswick in possession of a 
kilogram of cocaine. The police were to conduct 
the search of the accused’s home once a Quebec 
justice endorsed the New Brunswick search 
warrant.
While on his way to meet other officers for the 
search, an officer heard on the radio that the 
accused had just left his residence in his vehicle 
after placing an unidentified object in the trunk. A 
few moments later, the officer found the accused’s 
vehicle and pulled it over on a busy street during 
rush hour. The accused appeared nervous. The 
officer advised the accused he was under detention 
and told him the police had a search warrant for his 
home. He was directed to keep his hands on the 
steering wheel, then ordered out of his vehicle and 
to place his hands on its roof. The accused was 
handcuffed and taken to a patrol car. He was 
cooperative and not aggressive. 
Before being asked to sit in the back seat of the 
patrol car, the officer patted-down the accused. A 
loaded illegal handgun was discovered in the 
waistband of his trousers. The accused was then 
arrested and informed him of his rights. He was 
searched and a small quantity of heroin and 
cocaine was found in his possession. A vehicle 
search yielded no further evidence. The accused 
was charged with various offences related to his 
possession of a prohibited firearm, heroin and 
cocaine. He was also charged with breach of 
probation.
Court of Quebec
The judge found the accused was 
arrested, not merely  detained, when he 
was stopped. He held that the officer’s 
action in controlling the accused 
exceeded an investigative detention because the 
officer (1) asked the  accused to keep his hands on 
the steering wheel, (2) told him to get out of his 
vehicle, (3) handcuffed him, (4) told him that the 
police had a warrant to search his residence and 
that anything he said could be  held against him, (5) 
led him to the  patrol car, and (6) decided to search 
him before putting him in the vehicle. In the judge’s 
view, the police did not have the necessary 
reasonable grounds to believe the  accused was 
involved in the commission of an offence at the 
time of his arrest. The officer also acknowledged he 
did not subjectively believe  he had grounds for the 
arrest. The arrest was arbitrary and breached s. 9 of 
the Charter. 
As for the subsequent pat-down search, it was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the  Charter. The Crown 
failed to prove the warrantless pat-down search was 
justified on the basis of the officer having 
reasonable grounds to believe there was a threat to 
his safety or that of others. The off icer 
acknowledged he was not at all concerned for his 
safety or that of the public, and he did not feel 
threatened. The accused was in handcuffs, 
cooperative, not aggressive and other officer were 
nearby. The judge excluded the evidence under s. 
24(2) and the accused was acquitted. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The C rown appea l ed t he 
accused’s acquittals arguing the 
trial judge erred in finding (1) the 
accused was under arrest rather 
than simply being detained for investigative 
purposes and (2) the  accompanying pat-down 
search was unreasonable. In the Crown’s view, the 
trial judge imposed too high a burden on the officer 
to justify the accused’s detention. As a result, the 
Crown contended that the evidence ought not to 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
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Investigative Detention
The Court of Appeal described the police power to 
detain for investigative purposes as follows:
Investigative detention carried out in 
accordance with the common law power does 
not infringe the right protected by s. 9 of the 
Charter.  To justify investigative detention, a 
police officer must have reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the totality of the circumstances 
present a clear nexus between the detained 
individual and a recent or on-going criminal 
offence. In the absence of such reasonable 
suspicion, the detention becomes implicitly 
arbitrary and thereby infringes s. 9 of the 
Charter.  
The police officer’s subjective belief alone is 
not enough. The reasonable suspicion standard 
requires that the suspicion be based on 
objectively discernible facts. The analysis must 
be performed from the standpoint of a 
reasonable person “standing in the shoes of the 
police officer”. Reasonable suspicion must be 
a s se s sed aga in s t t he to t a l i t y o f t he 
circumstances. 
In addition, investigative detention must be 
conducted in a reasonable manner, taking into 
account the extent to which the interference 
with individual liberty is necessary to perform 
the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, 
and the nature and extent of that interference.
In every case, investigative detention must be 
brief in duration and must not become a de 
facto arrest. 
[...]
Investigative detention must not only be 
justified, it must, above all, be reasonably 
necessary. [footnotes omitted, paras. 16-21]
Here, the Court of Appeal agreed that the accused’s 
detention was arbitrary. Although it could be 
inferred that the officer had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused was involved in drug 
trafficking in general, there were no reasonable 
grounds to suspect he was committing or about to 
commit an offence at the time of the stop. Nor did 
the police officer properly exercise his power of 
investigative detention:
[The officer] intervened with the intention of 
detaining the [accused] to prevent him from 
hindering the imminent search of his home and 
in the hopes of obtaining a warrant to search 
the trunk of his vehicle where he had allegedly 
place an unidentified object when he left his 
home.
These two grounds do not justify detaining the 
[accused]. He had just left his home and was 
unaware of the impending search. There was 
nothing to indicate that he was about to return 
to his home or, even if that had been the case, 
that he would hinder the search. 
Furthermore, the mere fact that the [accused] 
had placed an unidentified object in the trunk 
of his car did not raise a suspicion that an 
offence was on-going or make investigative 
detention necessary. The [accused’s] residence 
was under surveillance when he left his home. 
No one found it necessary to intercept him at 
that time, just as no one had detained him 
during previous surveillance operations. The 
police cannot use investigative detention as an 
excuse while they search for evidence. 
[footnotes omitted, paras. 22-24]  
De Facto Arrest
Furthermore, it was open to the  trial judge to 
conclude that the accused’s detention amounted to 
a de facto arrest within the first few minutes of the 
“The police officer’s subjective belief alone is not enough. The reasonable 
suspicion standard requires that the suspicion be based on objectively discernible 
facts. The analysis must be performed from the standpoint of a reasonable person 
‘standing in the shoes of the police officer’. Reasonable suspicion must be 
assessed against the totality of the circumstances.”
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stop. This de facto arrest, however, was not based 
on reasonable grounds to believe that the accused 
was involved in drug trafficking at the time of the 
stop. The officer acknowledged he did not 
subjectively believe he had such grounds and the 
facts did not establish that he could have 
objectively believed there were such grounds. 
Thus, whether the stop was merely an investigative 
detention or an arrest, neither action was justified 
and therefore the accused’s s. 9 Charter right was 
breached. 
The Pat-Down Search
The Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge 
did not err in concluding the pat-down search was 
unlawful and therefore breached s. 8. Since neither 
an investigative detention or a de facto arrest was 
unlawful, a search of the accused incidental thereto 
was unreasonable. In this case, the Crown had not 
proven that the officer was justified in conducting a 
pat-down search. He did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe there was a threat to his safety 
or that of others. The officer searched the accused 
solely for the purpose of confining him in the 
police vehicle. And further: 
It is true that the police systematically search 
detainees before putting them in the police car. 
In such cases, however, the search follows a 
lawful arrest. This case, however, presents a 
completely different state of affairs. Even if it 
were accepted that drug traffickers are often 
armed, in the circumstances, an experienced 
officer knew or should have known that he had 
no grounds to detain the [accused] and 
therefore to search him. [para. 36]
s. 24(2) Charter
The trial judge  did not err in excluding the 
evidence resulting from the arbitrary detention and 
unreasonable search. First, the Charter breach was 
serious. The officer exceeded his authority in 
detaining the accused. There was no urgency to act 
and nothing  to lead the officer to believe that the 
object placed in the truck  was illegal or likely to 
disappear. In addition, the officer did not advise the 
accused of the true reasons for his detention nor 
tell him of his rights. Nor was the officer acting in 
good faith. Second, while the impact of the 
breaches (a relatively non-intrusive detention and 
pat-down search) were not egregious, they were 
significant. And there was no urgency or danger 
that the accused would destroy the evidence sought 
by the search warrant. Finally, despite the reliability 
of the evidence and its importance to the Crown’s 
prosecution, society’s interest in the adjudication of 
the case on its merits did not outweigh the 
seriousness of the breaches nor their significant 
impact on the accused.  
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the 
accused’s acquittals upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GROUNDS FOR ARREST 
CONSIDERED DIFFERENTLY 
THAN GROUNDS FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT
R. v. Buchanan, 2020 ONCA 245
The police received information from
a confidential informer that a man was 
trafficking heroin and fentanyl out of a 
specific residential address. Police 
also had received several citizen 
complaints about vehicle and pedestrian traffic at 
the residence. As a result, police  set up surveillance 
on the home over two days. They saw activity 
consistent with what they believed to be drug 
trafficking at the home. This included numerous 
individuals, some of who were  known drug users 
and one a known heroin dealer, attending at the 
residence on foot, by bicycle, and by car. Most of 
the individuals stayed in the residence fort less than 
10 minutes and sometimes three  minutes or less. 
And, in a few instances, individuals entering the 
residence were seen placing something  in their 
pockets or had something in their hands. Based on 
the confidential tip and their surveillance of the 
home, the police unsuccessfully applied for a 
search warrant. The justice  provided the police with 
the following reason for denying the search 
warrant:
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Grounds as presented and when considered in 
totality, falls short of rpg to believe that items 
to be searched for will be at the  location. No 
evidence to show that heroin and fentanyl 
would be in residence.
After learning that the search warrant had been 
denied, the police decided to arrest “the next 
suspected buyers.” The accused’s vehicle was next 
to arrive at the address. The accused and his 
passenger went into the home, stayed about 15 
minutes and then left. This observation led police to 
believe that there were grounds to arrest the 
accused and his passenger for being in possession 
of a controlled substance. Two uniform officers 
were instructed to pull over the vehicle and make 
the arrests. Upon searching the vehicle incident to 
arrest, the police found a stolen, loaded, restricted 
firearm in a case that had been secreted behind a 
modified glove box; four cell phones; a  significant 
amount of cash; and 23.56 grams of cocaine and 
29.84 grams of heroin packaged in small baggies. 
The drugs were secreted in an air vent. Other 
evidence related to the ownership, insurance and 
financing of the vehicle was found. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The team leader testified that he 
understood the warrant to have been 
denied because there were insufficient 
grounds to believe that heroin and 
fentanyl, as opposed to other controlled substances, 
were in the residence. That is why he said he 
instructed his team to “arrest the next suspected 
buyers … [p]ersons that come and show behaviour 
similar to what we’ve observed over the last couple 
of days.” It was his hope that the police would then 
obtain grounds to advance a second search warrant 
application for the home. He testified:
… I believe we have reasonable grounds to 
make the arrest and then search incident to 
arrest. Yes, I would hope to locate the  drugs 
that in my mind, they’re purchasing from the 
residence, and they’re under arrest for 
possession of a controlled substance, and 
then we have the evidence to support that 
which then I can add to my warrant 
hopefully meet the threshold to get the 
warrant for [the address].
The judge concluded that the accused’s ss. 8 and 9 
Charter rights had been violated. The accused’s 
arrest was unlawful as the police lacked sufficient 
reasonable grounds to do so. Although the police 
subjectively believed the accused had purchased 
drugs in the residence, their belief was not 
objectively reasonable  in the circumstances. Thus, 
the arrest was arbitrary under s. 9. Since the arrest 
was unlawful, the search flowing from the unlawful 
arrest was unreasonable under s. 8.
As for the admissibility of the evidence under s. 
24(2), the judge admitted the gun and drugs. First, 
the Charter breaches were serious, but not 
egregious, abusive or flagrant. The police were 
merely negligent and the court need not distance 
itself from the  police conduct. Although the police 
did not have sufficient grounds to arrest the 
accused, they had enough to justify an investigative 
detention. However, the police failed to consider 
that option. Even so, a search incidental to an 
investigative detention would not have permitted a 
search of the vehicle where the drugs and gun were 
located. Second, the  impact of the breach on the 
accused’s Charter-protected interests was significant 
and favoured exclusion. Finally, the charges were 
serious and the value of the evidence was 
significant. The evidence was reliable and critical to 
the Crown’s case. This favoured inclusion. Upon 
balancing all three  factors of the s. 24(2) analysis, 
the judge was not satisfied that the admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. The accused was convicted of 
various drug trafficking and firearms offences and 
he was sentenced to four-and-a-half-years in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued the trial 
judge made three mistakes in 
her s. 24(2) assessment about the 
seriousness of the Charter-
infringing police conduct. First, he submitted the 
police did not have the  grounds to conduct an 
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investigative detention let alone even to stop his 
vehicle. Second, arresting him after the search 
warrant rejection showed a “cynical disregard” for 
the judicial process. He contended the police 
misinterpreted the warrant denial as an invitation to 
arrest the next suspected buyer. Third, police 
negligence was a factor that pulled towards 
exclusion, not inclusion as the trial judge found. In 
his view, any of these errors required a new s. 24(2) 
analysis and the exclusion of the evidence.
Recognizing that strong deference is owed to a trial 
judge’s s. 24(2) analysis — absent an error in 
principle, a palpable and overriding factual error or 
an unreasonable determination —  Justice Fairburn, 
delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeal, 
concluded there was no basis to overturn the trial 
judge’s decision.
Investigative Detention
In agreeing with the trial judge 
that the police had sufficient 
grounds to detain the  accused for 
investigation, the Appeal Court 
first described this power as 
follows:
The police may detain an individual for 
investigation where, in all of the circumstances, 
there exist reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the individual is connected to a particular 
crime and the individual’s detention is 
necessary. Reasonable grounds to suspect is a 
lower standard than reasonable grounds to 
believe. The first engages a reasonable 
possibility, while the latter engages a 
reasonable probability. When determining 
whether those thresholds have been reached, a 
common sense and practical approach to 
considering all of the circumstances is called 
for. [references omitted, para. 23]
In this case, the trial judge found the grounds the 
police did have rose to the  level of a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was in possession of a 
controlled substance, which was sufficient to justify 
an investigative detention. Justice Fairburn agreed, 
holding “there were ample grounds upon which to 
detain the [accused] for investigation.” The police 
were dealing with information coming from a 
confidential informer that had been amply 
confirmed. The police had much more than the 
simple  attendance of a person at a suspected drug 
house. All of the  circumstances known to the police 
at the time they intercepted the accused, filtered 
through “their practical, everyday experience to 
the interpretation of what they were seeing”, must 
be taken into account:
 ... There was a confidential tip about drug 
trafficking at the exact residence where 
civilians had made complaints about activity 
that suggested short visits to buy drugs. Police 
surveillance confirmed that activity, revealing 
numerous people, some of whom were known 
to the police from the local drug community, 
attending at the residence for very short periods 
of time. The police even observed what they 
believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction 
through the window of a vehicle out front of 
the residence, just prior to the [accused’s] 
attendance at the home. He was only in the 
home for fifteen minutes. Again, the police 
testified that this was consistent with a drug 
transaction.
There was an ample factual foundation upon 
which the trial judge could conclude that the 
police had sufficient grounds to detain the 
[accused] for investigation. Indeed, so plentiful 
were the grounds that this may well have been 
a case where the s. 9 issue could have resolved 
differently. [paras. 34-35]
“Reasonable grounds to suspect is a lower standard than reasonable grounds to 
believe. The first engages a reasonable possibility, while the latter engages a 
reasonable probability. When determining whether those thresholds have been 
reached, a common sense and practical approach to considering all of the 
circumstances is called for.”
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The Search Warrant Refusal
The Court of Appeal 
found the police did 
not improperly ignore 
the denial of the search 
warrant application. Far 
from seeing the denial 
of the search warrant as 
an “invitation” to arrest the next person who came 
to the residence, the denial “caused the police to 
pursue alternative means to advance their 
investigation.” Justice Fairburn noted “there is 
nothing inherently wrong with the police  using a 
lawful arrest to advance an investigation, even 
where that arrest is to assist with furnishing the 
grounds upon which a search warrant application 
may rest.”  And the police did not simply set out to 
arrest the next person to arrive at the  home. 
“Rather, they set out to arrest the next person who 
they believed to have done a drug transaction in 
the home,”  said Justice Fairburn. “In other words, 
they set out to arrest the next person they had 
reasonable grounds to arrest. Given the short time 
that the [accused] attended at the residence, the 
police  believed that he fit the same pattern as the 
people who they had been previously seen coming 
and going from the residence.” Moreover, the 
refusal of a  search warrant does not mean the 
police do not have the grounds for an arrest:
The denial of a search warrant does not act as a 
legal declaration that the police are prohibited 
from using the grounds contained within the 
Information to Obtain the warrant to furnish 
grounds for other purposes. It is important to 
distinguish between the role of a justice in 
determining whether to issue a search warrant 
and the role of the police in determining 
whether they have sufficient grounds to arrest. 
These are two fundamentally different acts.
When considering whether to issue a search 
warrant, a Justice of the Peace has a specific 
and discrete job to do: consider whether there 
are sufficient reasonable grounds to support the 
statutory prerequisites to issuance. Justices are 
not required to give reasons for granting or 
dismissing search warrant applications. 
Accordingly, it will not always be possible to 
know why a search warrant has been denied. 
There may be any number of reasons for the 
dismissal of an application, including 
insufficient grounds about the alleged offence, 
about the location to be searched, whether the 
items to be seized are in the location to be 
searched and so on.
On the other hand, the grounds for arrest 
involve an assessment o f a l l o f the 
circumstances known to the police at the time 
of the arrest. In this case, those circumstances 
involved information that was included in the 
Information to Obtain the search warrant, but 
also included what the police observed while 
the warrant was being considered: what 
appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction 
outside of the home. Determining whether the 
police had sufficient grounds to justify an arrest 
is a matter that falls within the exclusive 
domain of the trial judge.
While I accept that it would be wise for the 
police to pause and consider the strength of 
their grounds in the face of a search warrant 
denial, particularly where their grounds to 
arrest overlap with the grounds for the search 
warrant, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
the police pursuing other investigative options 
based upon their own view of the facts. In other 
“[T]here is nothing inherently wrong with the police pursuing other investigative 
options based upon their own view of the facts. In other words, the police are not 
required to alter what they believe (or suspect) to be true, simply because a search 
warrant has been denied.”
“[T]here is  nothing inherently wrong 
with the police using a lawful arrest to 
advance an investigation, even where 
that arrest is to assist with furnishing 
the grounds upon which a search 
warrant application may rest.” 
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words, the police are not required to alter what 
they believe (or suspect) to be true, simply 
because a search warrant has been denied. 
[reference omitted, para. 41-44] 
In this case, the justice denying the search warrant 
said it was because she  was not satisfied that the 
specific drugs – heroin and fentanyl – would be 
found in the place to be searched.  “The police 
were not, as the [accused] suggests, flouting the 
Justice of the Peace’s decision,”  said Justice 
Fairburn. “Indeed, to the contrary, they showed 
respect for that decision and worked toward 
obtaining further grounds to fill what the  Justice of 
the Peace perceived as the gap in the warrant 
application: evidence respecting the actual drugs 
of heroin and fentanyl.”     
Negligent Police Conduct 
The trial found that the 
police were mistaken in 
their belief that they had 
reasonable grounds to 
arrest. While the trial judge 
rejected the notion that the 
Charter breaches were 
inadvertent or minor, she 
held they were closer to negligent conduct than to 
blatant, wilful or reckless conduct. In doing so, the 
trial judge was aware that not every Charter breach 
is equal and she exercised her discretion — which 
was owed deference -— in where she placed the 
police conduct on the “spectrum” of seriousness. 
Moreover, not all negligent police  conduct pushes 
evidence towards exclusion. “While negligence 
cannot be equated with good faith, neither can it 
necessarily be equated with bad faith,” said Justice 
Fairburn. “Negligent police  conduct itself may fall 
on a spectrum. Clear violations of well-established 
rules governing state conduct may exist at one end 
of a negligence spectrum, while less clear 
violations of less clear rules may be  at the  other.” 
In this case, she noted that the following:
... [T]he law surrounding the grounds for arrest 
has been clear for some time. But it is a test that 
is applied using the best judgment of police 
officers, engaged in real time, on the ground 
policing. There is a difference between a police 
officer miscalculating whether she had 
sufficient grounds to arrest, when on the trial 
judge’s view she only had sufficient grounds to 
detain for investigation, and other more serious 
forms of police miscalculation. As found by the 
trial judge, there was nothing cavalier or 
flagrant about the police conduct. Nor was 
there any pattern of Charter breaches. In my 
view, if the police were short on reasonable 
grounds to arrest, it was by a short distance 
only. The fact is that the trial judge did not find 
that the level of negligence, a simple, 
unintentional miscalculation as to the strength 
of the grounds to arrest, rose to the level that 
would aggravate the seriousness of the state-
infringing conduct. She is owed deference on 
that point. [para. 54]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Negligent police conduct itself may fall on a spectrum. Clear violations of well-
established rules governing state conduct may exist at one end of a negligence 
spectrum, while less clear violations of less clear rules may be at the other.” 
“[T]he law surrounding the grounds 
for arrest has been clear for some 
time. But it is a test that is applied 
using the best judgment of police 
officers, engaged in real time, on the 
ground policing. There is a difference 
between a police officer 
miscalculating whether she had 
sufficient grounds to arrest ... and 
other more serious forms of police 
miscalculation.”
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SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS 
IN CONDOMINIUM HALLWAY 
AMOUNTED TO A SEARCH
R. v. Pipping, 2020 BCCA 104
While investigating a suspected
dial-a-dope operation involving a
number of people, undercover police
officers used an identified telephone
number associated with the operation
to make a number of drug purchases. In the  course 
of their undercover operation, police  eventually 
came to meet the accused Summers (believed to be 
the manager of the dial-a-dope line) and the 
accused Pipping (believed to be the “boss”). These 
two accused became key targets and the police set 
out to discover where they might be keeping their 
drugs and cash. 
Police followed the two men. Undercover officers 
saw them enter a condominium complex. It was a 
four-level building containing 96 units with key 
access to outside entrances. There was open access 
once inside and no video surveillance. The police 
wanted to identify which unit the accused might be 
using, but the property management company 
refused to provide tenant information without a 
production order. The police subsequently obtained 
a general warrant under s.  487.01 of the Criminal 
Code. The genera l warrant ordered the 
management company to provide a key  to police 
and permit them access to the common areas of the 
condominium complex, including the foyer, 
entrance way, stairwells, hallways, elevators, 
access / egress points as well as the underground 
parking.  
The police entered the building and positioned 
themselves on all four floors. One of the officers 
was able to sur rept i t ious ly observe the 
accused  Pipping enter unit 407 with a key. The 
police then used this observation as the basis to 
seek and obtain a search warrant for unit 407. The 
police executed the search warrant and discovered 
drugs, cash, and firearms. The accused Pipping was 
charged with several drug and firearm-related 
charges. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found the accused Pipping had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy  in 
the common areas of the condominium 
complex and therefore had standing to 
challenge the validity of the general warrant. In the 
judge’s view, the facts established a low but 
nevertheless reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the hallway leading to the unit where the accused 
was seen to enter with a key. This expectation was 
subjectively held and objectively based. The judge 
then held that the actions of the police — 
undercover surveillance performed in the common 
hallway outside a suite accessed by the accused in 
a condominium complex having a locked main 
door — amounted to a covert search. Thus, the 
notice provision under s. 487.01(5.1) was required. 
However, the judge ruled that the  absence of a 
notice provision did not affect the validity of the 
general warrant and, even if it did, its absence 
could be addressed under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The accused was convicted of possessing fentanyl, 
cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin for the 
purpose of trafficking, producing fentanyl, and 
possessing a loaded restricted firearm and a 
prohibited device, a silencer. The accused was also 
convicted of trafficking in cocaine and in heroin/
EVIDENCE
found in search of unit 407 included:
• Furanyl fentanyl, fentanyl, fentanyl/heroin, heroin,
cocaine, W18 and methamphetamine having a total
estimated street value of $1,366,160.
• Cutting agents and other chemicals such as acetone,
acetic acid and dimethyl sulfoxide.
• A number of firearms, including a 9 mm Beretta
handgun, firearm silencer, and ammunition. Some of the
firearms were loaded.
• Kitchen blenders, bottles of flavoring and food coloring, a
discoloured kitchen stove, and a large press that could be
used to make kilogram sized bricks.
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fentanyl based on drug purchases by undercover 
officers. His sentenced included 15 year’s in prison 
less time served and paying the owner of the 
c o n d o m i n i u m u n i t $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 a s p a r t i a l 
compensation for remediation costs.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused Pipping argued 
that the general warrant under 
which the police entered the 
condominium complex in order 
to determine which unit he was associated with 
was not lawfully  issued because it failed to contain 
the requisite statutory notice provision. He sought a 
stay of proceedings on all counts or, in the 
alternative, he wanted an acquittal on the charges 
related to the evidence obtained in the search of 
the condominium unit or a new trial to be ordered 
on those counts. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
accused did not have a reasonable  expectation of 
pr ivacy in the  common hal lway o f the 
condominium building and therefore it was 
unnecessary for the  police to have obtained a 
general warrant at all to enter the building. In its 
opinion, the accused’s connection to the 
condominium complex was tenuous as he was 
neither the owner nor registered tenant, and the 
hallway was a public space once entry to the 
building was gained. And, even if a warrant was 
necessary, the Crown contended that the  notice 
provision under s. 487.01(5.1) of the  Criminal Code 
was not necessary. Further, in the event of a Charter 
breach, the Crown asserted the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Common Areas and REP
“Whether a general warrant 
was required and whether the 
search of the common areas 
was covert are both issues 
related to the question of 
whether [the accused] had a 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy  in the common area,” 
said Justice Garson, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
decision. “If he did have  a  reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the common area, then the police 
required a warrant to search that area.” In this 
case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that the accused did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the hallway of the 
condominium outside unit 407.
Whether or not a  person can establish a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy requires a contextual 
approach. Here, this assessment will focus on such 
factors as:
• The manner public access to the common areas 
of a building is controlled (ie. “the ability  to 
regulate access, including the right to admit or 
exclude others from the place”;
• The exclusivity of occupation;
• The size of the building;
• W h e t h e r p r o p e r t y  m a n a g e m e n t o r a 
condominium board has consented to the police 
presence;
• The breadth of the observations being made by 
the police;
• The ownership of the property; and
• The frequency  with which a particular area is 
used.
Although the breadth of the police observations 
were narrow in this case, the building was secure 
and the  property manager refused to grant police 
access to the building without a warrant. There was 
no video surveillance in the hallways and unit 407 
was at the end of a hallway. “In my view, the judge 
was correct to find that the occupants of the 
building reasonably  expected that entry to the 
building would be limited to invitees and 
otherwise members of the public would be 
excluded,” said Justice Garson. The trial judge’s 
decision that the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the hallway outside unit 
407 was upheld.
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Was the search covert?
Under s. 487.01(5.1), a  general warrant authorizing 
a covert search requires notice of the search be 
given after the fact:
A warrant issued under subsection (1) that 
authorizes a peace officer to enter and search a 
place covertly shall require … that notice of the 
entry and search be given within any time after 
the execution of the warrant that the judge 
considers reasonable in the circumstances.
Since he had a reasonable privacy interest in the 
hallway outside the apartment, the accused 
suggested that the police surveillance in the 
hallway was a covert search. On the other hand, 
the Crown argued that the  search was not covert 
because  there was no surreptitious entry and the 
observations were made from a common area. 
Thus, there was no requirement that the general 
warrant contain a notice provision.
The Court of Appeal upheld 
the trial judge’s finding that 
the undercover surveillance 
was a covert search. “Given 
that the search in this case 
w a s c o n d u c t e d b y 
undercover officers seeking 
to avoid detection, in my 
v i e w t h e t r i a l j u d g e 
committed no palpable and overriding error by 
finding that the  police surveillance here 
constituted a covert search,” said Justice Garson. 
She continued:
While the Crown is correct to note that the 
warrant was directed to the property manager, 
who is the agent of the owners of the 
condominium units, and that the warrant itself 
makes no mention of a covert search, in my 
view this misses the point. The inquiry must 
focus not on the words of the warrant but on 
what the police sought to do. The police sought 
to covertly observe [the accused] in the 
hallway. This conclusion is supported by the 
language used in the Information to Obtain the 
general warrant, which reads in material part:
175) This General Warrant involves allowing
the police to have access to the common areas
o f the [Burnaby P roper ty ] to make
observations of what suite(s) [the accused] are
accessing and using for their drug trafficking
operation.
176) Given the nature of this investigation,
covertly being able to confirm which suite(s)
[the accused] are accessing without arousing
their suspicions will assist police in identifying
which suite(s) to target for a CDSA search
warrant.
[Emphasis added.]
No Notice, Invalid Warrant?
Contrary to the trial judge’s ruling that the general 
warrant was not invalid despite  the absence of 
notice of the warrant, the Court of Appeal came to 
a different conclusion. “It is reasonable to 
interpret s.  487.01(5.1) as imposing a mandatory 
notice requirement after the fact because the 
anticipated search is covert or unknown to the 
individual whose privacy rights are being intruded 
upon,”  said Justice Garson. “The failure  to abide by 
a statutorily-mandated requirement to provide
notice fails to give effect to s.  8 protections and 
infringes the Charter. In my view, the trial judge 
erred in finding that the lack of notice provision 
did not affect the validity of the general warrant. I 
conclude that the lack of a provision requiring the 
police  to give  notice of their covert entry rendered 
the general warrant invalid.”
s. 24(2) Charter
Since the accused had a privacy interest in the 
common areas of the condominium building and 
the general warrant was invalid, the covert search 
conducted by the police in the hallway breached 
his s. 8 Charter rights. The observations made 
during this covert search were used to obtain a 
warrant to search the condominium unit. Without 
these observations, the warrant to search the 
condominium unit could not have issued, a point 
the Crown conceded. Thus, the Court of Appeal 
excised the surveillance observation related to unit 
407 from the Information to Obtain the search 
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warrant and proceeded on the basis that the search 
of unit 407 was warrantless and a s. 8 breach. 
However, the Court of Appeal nevertheless 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). First, the 
Charter breach was not serious. The breach was 
technical and “the police did not commit any  real 
misconduct.” The trial judge found the police 
operated in good faith throughout the investigation. 
There was no intent to deceive or mislead, and 
there  was no pattern of abuse. This factor did not 
favour exclusion. Second, the impact of the breach 
on the Charter rights of the accused was serious, 
but attenuated by the fact he had not established 
any legal right of access to the  premises. The owner 
of the unit believed it was being rented to someone 
else. Nevertheless, this factor favoured exclusion. 
Finally, society had a strong interest in the 
adjudication of this case. The evidence obtained 
from unit 407 was reliable and crucial to seven of 
the accused’s 10 convictions for serious drug 
offences, including producing fentanyl. In 
balancing the three s. 24(2) factors, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the exclusion of the 
evidence, not its admission, would bring the 
administration of justice  into disrepute even 
“though the unconstitutional search of a residence 
strikes at the heart of the privacy interests 
protected by s. 8.”
Editor’s note: The  accused Pipping had a  co-
accused on this matter (Summers). Additional 
details taken from R. v. Pipping and Summers, 2018 
BCPC 223, 
ARREST SHY OF REASONABLE 
GROUNDS WAS AN ARBITRARY 
DETENTION, BUT EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Chapman, 2020 SKCA 11
The accused was travelling alone 
eastbound on Highway #1 in 
Saskatchewan driving a vehicle he 
rented in British Columbia two days 
earlier. He passed marked police  cars 
with their lights activated that were stopped behind 
another motorist. It appeared the accused did not 
reduce his speed to below 60 kilometres per hour 
as required by Saskatchewan's Traffic  Safety Act 
(TSA) when passing  emergency vehicles. As a 
result, officers caught up to the accused and pulled 
him over. 
One officer went to the accused’s driver’s side door 
while the other went to the passenger side. They 
saw that the vehicle  was a rental based on its 
licence plate. There was a radar detector attached 
to the vehicle’s windshield and an empty energy 
drink container on the passenger’s side floor. One 
of the officers spoke with the accused, but did not 
advise him of the reason for the stop. The officer 
immediately noticed that the accused appeared to 
be very nervous. He had a “nervous twitch” in his 
upper lip and his hands were visibly shaking when 
he provided his driver’s licence, vehicle registration 
and rental agreement. 
Impact of breach on 
accused’s Charter-
protected interests
Seriousness of Charter-
infringing police 
conduct
Society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case 
on its merits
s.
24
(2
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rte
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When asked where he was going, the accused said 
he was on his way to Moose Jaw to visit a friend. 
Upon examining the rental agreement, the officer 
saw that the vehicle had been rented in Richmond, 
British Columbia  and was required to return it to 
Calgary, Alberta three days later. The officer was 
suspicious of the accused’s story given the stated 
purpose for the trip and the distance to be travelled 
in a relatively short period of time. The officer 
returned to his police vehicle  and queried the 
accused on his in-car computer. A CPIC query 
disclosed that the accused had been convicted of 
weapons offences and, as a  result, was subject to a 
ten-year firearm prohibition order. A PIP query 
suggested the accused was involved in illegal gang 
and drug activity  in the lower mainland of British 
Columbia. Unfortunately, the officer’s computer 
froze  and 15 to 20 minutes were spent trying to 
reboot it, all the while the accused remained seated 
in his vehicle.  
Another officer, who had a drug sniffing dog with 
him, arrived on scene. He was advised of the 
computer trouble  and asked to let the accused 
know they would be another minute. When this 
officer attended to the accused’s vehicle and spoke 
with him, he saw the accused was sweating 
profusely and that his lip was quivering. He also 
noticed the radar detector. The officers discussed 
their observations and information from the 
computer queries. This discussion was some 30 
minutes after the  initial stop. The officers decided 
they had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused, 
believing he  was in possession of illegal drugs. 
They felt there was no need to deploy the drug 
sniffing dog given they already had more than 
reasonable suspicion. 
The accused was then advised he had initially been 
stopped for speeding and immediately was arrested 
for possessing a controlled substance. His vehicle 
was searched and police discovered a  body panel 
in the cargo area of the vehicle that appeared to 
have been moved or manipulated. When the body 
panel was removed, police found three individual 
one-kilogram bricks of cocaine. The accused was 
then re-arrested for possession for the purpose of 
trafficking and subsequently charged.
P o l i c e e x p l a n a t i o n p r o v i d e d f o r 
significance of factors
• Nervousness. Accused had a higher than expected level
of nervousness than what an innocent motorist would be
expected to have.
• Presence of a five hour energy drink. Travelling
criminals use such drinks to sustain long driving periods
because they are at greater risk of being stopped when
in transit on the highway with their contraband and they
want to get to their destination as quick as possible. The
use of these drinks helps them stay awake to keep
driving.
• Radar detector. These devices alert travelling
criminals of the presence of police and this helps them
modify their driving accordingly to avoid detection.
• Radar detector in a rental. Rental cars do not come
equipped with radar detectors so it would have had to
be placed in the car for the specific trip.
• Rental car. Travelling criminals know these vehicles
are newer and more reliable and less likely to break
down which would be a problem. In addition, having a
rental avoids forfeiture of the criminal’s own vehicle.
Being in a rental car provides a level of anonymity. The
rental cannot be associated to the criminal unlike if the
criminal is using his own vehicle which may be known to
the police.
• The rental agreement. Showed accused had rented the
car on September 17 in Richmond, British Columbia
and was due back in Calgary, Alberta on September 20
at noon and they had stopped him on September 19.
This connected to the accused’s statement that he was
going to see a friend in Moose Jaw and yet had to have
the rental back to Calgary the next day at noon. This
would leave the accused little time to visit in Moose
Jaw. Police felt this story defied logic and was
nonsensical.
• Canned story. Travelling criminals often have
rehearsed or canned stories and this appeared to be the
case here.
• Place of rental/departure. The car was rented in
British Columbia, a known source of illicit drugs. The
accused was travelling east which was a known route
for drugs from British Columbia to the east. This also
helped in deciding that the contraband would be drugs
and other contraband like guns.
• The CPIC conviction. The accused had a conviction for
a weapon offence and was on a 10 year prohibition.
• PIP data. The police intelligence indicated gang and
drug involvement for the accused.
• Overall query. Police believed the accused had
involvement with guns, gangs and drugs.
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused opined that several of his 
Charter rights had been violated. First, he 
submitted that the initial stop was 
unlawful (s. 9 Charter). Second, the 
police failed to inform him of the reason for the 
stop (s. 10(a) Charter). Third, the police  lacked 
reasonable grounds to arrest him (s. 9 Charter). He 
asserted that the police at best had only a 
reasonable suspicion and should have used other 
police techniques such as an interview and/or 
deploying the sniffer dog before arresting him. 
Finally, since his arrest was unlawful, the search of 
his vehicle incidental to the arrest was 
unreasonable (s. 8 Charter). In his view, any 
evidence gathered post-stop was unlawfully 
obtained and inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
The judge found the initial traffic stop was lawful. 
The police honestly believed the accused was 
travelling greater than 60 km/h and treated the 
matter as nothing more than a traffic stop until the 
officers conferred about the totality  of their 
observations and turned their minds to the 
possibility that the accused was in possession of 
illegal drugs. As for being promptly informed of the 
reason for his detention, the judge determined that 
the accused’s s. 10(a) right had been violated 
because  he had not initially  been told of the reason 
for the stop. The judge, however, found this was 
simply  a mistake by one officer which was not 
known to the others. Further, the  judge concluded 
that were no other ss. 10(a) or 10(b) breaches up 
until the point the officers had decided they had 
grounds for an arrest. No additional information 
needed to be provided about the reason for the stop 
and it was not required that the accused be 
informed of his right to counsel during  the traffic 
stop matter. 
As for the arrest, the judge found it was lawful. The 
police had the necessary reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused possessed a controlled 
substance based on the following factors: extreme 
nervousness; a rental vehicle; the rental agreement; 
the destination; the nonsensical story of travel; the 
canned story; the energy drink; the radar detector; 
and the police queries. Since the  arrest was lawful, 
the search of the vehicle was incidental to the 
arrest. 
Despite the s. 10(a) breach, the judge admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). First, the s. 10(a) breach 
was relatively minor. The officer made a “regettable 
mistake” in failing to advise the accused he was 
being stopped for speeding. This was not a systemic 
problem, nor borne  from wilful blindness, bad faith 
or a blatant disregard for Charter rights. Second, the 
impact of the breach on the accused was minor. 
BY THE BOOK:
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act 
Speed limits when passing 
emergency vehicles 
s. 204(1) No person shall drive a
vehicle on a highway at a speed
greater than 60 kilometres per hour when 
passing an emergency vehicle that is stopped 
on the highway with its emergency lights in 
operation. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if: (a) the
vehicle is being driven on a divided highway;
and (b) the vehicle is travelling on the
opposite roadway from the emergency vehicle.
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This was an otherwise routine traffic stop and much 
of the time the accused was kept waiting was taken 
up by “appropriate and proper police work.” 
Finally, society had an interest in this case being 
adjudicated on its merits. The evidence was non-
bodily physical evidence and highly reliable. The 
accused was convicted of possessing a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking and 
sentenced to three years’ in prison. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
conviction contending that the 
trial judge erred in failing to find 
his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of 
the Charter had been breached. He further 
submitted that the trial judge erred by admitting the 
evidence under s. 24(2) when his s. 10(a) right had 
been violated. He also sought a stay of proceedings 
under s. 24(1) as a result of the Charter breaches. 
Arbitrary Detention
Justice Kalmakoff, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
judgement, agreed that the initial detention for 
speeding was lawful based upon the trial judge’s 
factual findings. The stop was authorized by the 
TSA and its purpose did not change until the 
officers decided to arrest the accused for possessing 
a controlled substance. 
Once the accused was arrested, his detention 
would become arbitrary and breach s. 9 if the arrest 
was unlawful. Since the warrantless search of the 
accused’s vehicle was incidental to his arrest, the 
Crown bore the burden of proving both the 
lawfulness of the arrest and the reasonableness of 
the vehicle search. Justice Kalmakoff described the 
Criminal Code power of arrest:
Section 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code gives a 
police officer the power to arrest, without a 
warrant, a person “who has committed an 
indicatable [sic] offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, [the officer] believes has committed or 
is about to commit an indictable offence”. A 
warrantless arrest made without the requisite 
“reasonable grounds to believe” is unlawful 
and violates s. 9 of the Charter. In this case, the 
question of whether the trial judge was correct 
to conclude that [the accused] was not 
arbitrarily detained turns on the lawfulness of 
his arrest or, more precisely, whether, at the 
time of the arrest, [the arresting officer] had 
reasonable grounds to believe that [the 
accused] had committed the indictable offence 
of possessing a controlled substance.
[...]
When the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest 
under s. 495(1)(a) is challenged, the 
determination of whether the arresting officer 
had the requisite “reasonable grounds to 
believe” involves an assessment of whether that 
officer subjectively believed the individual 
arrested had committed or was about to 
commit an indictable offence, and whether the 
observations and circumstances articulated by 
the arresting officer(s) are objectively capable 
of supporting that belief. The question is 
whether an objective observer, standing in the 
shoes of the police officer with an awareness of 
the same circumstances, would conclude it was 
reasonable to believe the individual had 
committed or was about to commit an 
indictable offence. [reference omitted, paras. 
53, 55]
“When the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)(a) is challenged, the 
determination of whether the arresting officer had the requisite ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ involves an assessment of whether that officer subjectively 
believed the individual arrested had committed or was about to commit an 
indictable offence, and whether the observations and circumstances articulated 
by the arresting officer(s) are objectively capable of supporting that belief.”
“A warrantless arrest made without 
the requisite ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ is unlawful and violates s. 9 of 
the Charter.”
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Justice Kalmakoff reviewed appellate jurisprudence 
and noted several principles guiding the 
determination of whether reasonable grounds for 
arrest exist. These include:
• An arresting officer must subjectively  hold
reasonable grounds to arrest and those grounds
must be justifiable from an objective point of
view – in other words, a reasonable person
placed in the position of the arresting officer
must be able to conclude there were indeed
reasonable grounds for the arrest.
• The reasonable grounds to believe standard is
not overly onerous. An arresting officer is not
required to establish the  commission of an
indictable offence on a balance of probabilities
or a prima facie case for conviction before
making the arrest; but an arresting officer must
act on something more than a “reasonable
suspicion” or a hunch.
• An arresting officer must consider all
incriminating and exonerating information
which the circumstances reasonably  permit, but
may disregard information which the officer has
reason to believe may be unreliable.
• A reviewing court must view the evidence
available to an arresting officer cumulatively, not
in a piecemeal fashion. Whether there were
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence
had been committed must be determined solely
on the facts known to the arresting officer and
available at the time the requisite belief was
formed.
• Where officers are acting as a  team, it is not
necessary  that the arresting officer personally
knows each and every fact necessary to 
establish reasonable grounds; the collective 
knowledge of the entire group is relevant. The 
“knowledge”, of course, must consist of 
objective facts supported by evidence.
• The reasonable grounds standard must be
interpreted contextually, having regard to the
circumstances in their entirety, including the
timing involved, the events leading up to the
arrest both immediate and over time, and the
dynamics at play in the arrest and, context
includes the experience and training of the
arresting officer.
• A belief does not need to be correct in order to
be reasonable; reasonable grounds can be based
on an officer’s belief that certain facts exist, even
if that belief turns out to be mistaken.
• The inference drawn by the officer need not be
the only inference that may be drawn from the
available information, or even the most
compelling  one, as long as it is a reasonable
inference to have drawn. The presence of other
plausible, innocent explanations for police-
observed behaviour does not automatically
negate reasonable grounds to believe.
• There is no checklist or mathematical formula
with a certain number of indicia that must be
met before reasonable  grounds to believe  will
be established. There is no single identifiable
factor that marks the point at which reasonable
suspicion crosses the  threshold to become
reasonable belief.
• Distinguishing between reasonable suspicion
and reasonable grounds to believe is a
qualitative, not quantitative, exercise. While the
gap between them is not necessarily wide, the
two standards must remain distinguishable.
“A belief does not need to be correct in order to be reasonable; reasonable grounds 
can be based on an officer’s belief that certain facts exist, even if that belief turns 
out to be mistaken. Furthermore, the inference drawn by the officer need not be 
the only inference that may be drawn from the available information, or even the 
most compelling one, as long as it is a reasonable inference to have drawn. The 
presence of other plausible, innocent explanations for police-observed behaviour 
does not automatically negate reasonable grounds to believe.” 
“The reasonable grounds to believe 
standard is not overly onerous.” 
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• While the knowledge, training and experience
of the police officer(s) involved is a relevant
consideration in the determination of whether
the reasonable grounds to believe standard has
been met, deference is not always owed to a
police officer’s view of the circumstances. Police
testimony should not be seen as a “trump card”
simply because officers have  specialized
training and relevant experience, nor should a
police officer’s assessment of whether seemingly
innocuous observations are indicative of
criminal activity, based on that training and
experience, be accepted uncritically.
• It is important to remember that reasonable
grounds to believe is not intended to be a
standard that hampers effective police work, or
one that requires police officers to have an
airtight case  before taking action. The other side
of that coin, however, is that given the intrusive
nature of many police  powers that can be
exercised on the  basis of reasonable grounds to
believe, courts must be careful not to permit the
standard to be watered down or interpreted in a
way that effectively negates the difference
between reasonable belief and reasonable
suspicion.
In this case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
trial judge that the police had the requisite 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused. Although 
the officers subjectively believed they had the 
necessary  grounds, their belief was not objectively 
justified. “In my view, notwithstanding [one of the 
officer’s] considerable experience and his assertion 
regarding how that experience informed his 
subjective belief, the constellation of factors 
observed by the  officers in this case fell short of 
satisfying the objective criteria necessary to 
ground a reasonable belief that [the accused] was 
transporting illegal drugs at the time [the arresting 
officer] arrested him,” said Justice Kalmakoff. “I 
reach this conclusion, even taking into account the 
officers’ collective training and experience.” He 
explained as follows:
Most of the factors upon which the officers 
relied in this case were, individually, 
completely innocuous. In that regard, I am 
referring to [the accused’s] nervousness 
following the original stop, his route of travel, 
his destination, the fact that he was driving a 
rented vehicle, the use of a radar detector, and 
the presence of an empty energy drink 
container. In saying this, I am mindful of the 
need to consider the totality of the evidence, 
rather than examining individual factors in 
isolation. However, even when the more 
inculpatory factors are added to the mix – 
namely, [the accused’s] somewhat implausible 
story about the route of and purpose for his 
journey and the information gained from the 
police database queries (an old, unrelated 
conviction, and suspected involvement in gang 
and drug activity) – and are weighed together 
in light of the officers’ combined experience 
and training, the evidence as a whole does not 
reveal a strong connection between [the 
accused] and the criminal activity alleged. To 
an objective observer, in my view – even one 
with the level of training and experience of the 
officers in this case – this combination of 
factors suggests only a possibility, not a 
probability, that [the accused] was transporting 
illegal drugs. [para. 81]
And further:
In this case, I accept that the officers were 
acting on more than just a hunch, given the 
observations they had made, the information 
available to them, and their collective training 
and experience, when they arrested [the 
accused]. But “more than just a hunch” is not 
synonymous with “reasonable grounds to 
believe”. When viewed as a whole, the 
information upon which the officers relied in 
this case simply did not have the objective 
quality required to rise from reasonable 
“There is no checklist or mathematical 
formula with a certain number of 
indicia that must be met before 
reasonable grounds to believe will be 
established. There is no single 
identifiable factor that marks the 
point at which reasonable suspicion 
crosses the threshold to become 
reasonable belief.”
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suspicion to the more onerous standard of 
reasonable grounds to believe. That is, an 
objective observer, even with the collective 
training and experience of the officers in this 
case, would not be able to conclude that there 
was a probability, rather than just a possibility, 
that [the accused] was transporting illegal 
drugs. [para. 86]
... [M]any of the factors upon which the officers 
relied to support their belief were individually, 
and perhaps even collectively, innocuous. In 
addition to that, the CPIC and PIP database 
information, which appeared to be something 
upon which the officers placed heavy reliance 
in their consideration, did not reveal anything 
specific in nature. There is no question that 
information gained from police database 
queries is relevant and properly considered in 
determining whether police have reasonable 
grounds to suspect, or believe, that someone is 
involved in criminal activity, as it can show a 
propensity on the part of the person in 
question. However, when determining whether 
that information, when weighed together with 
other information, supports a reasonable belief, 
rather than just reasonable suspicion, it is 
important to consider the degree to which it 
connects the suspect to the crime in question. 
Recency, similarity, proximity, specificity and 
qua l i t y o f sou rce a re a l l impor t an t 
considerations.
In this case, at least on the basis of the 
evidence before the trial judge, the police 
database queries did not provide much that 
was compelling. A nine-year-old conviction for 
weapons offences had little connection to the 
nature of the offence for which Mr. Chapman 
was arrested and the evidence in the record 
about his “gang and drug” activity was non-
specific in terms of time or scope. In my view, 
even when considered with all the other 
available information, and in light of the 
officers’ collective experience, it was not 
enough to provide an objective basis to believe 
that [the accused] was committing the offence 
for which he was arrested. [references omitted, 
paras. 90-91]
The accused was arbitrarily detained and his s. 9 
Charter right was breached. 
Unreasonable Search?
Since there  were not reasonable grounds for the 
accused’s arrest, the warrantless search of his 
vehicle conducted incidental to the arrest was 
unreasonable and breached s. 8 of the Charter.
s. 24 of the Charter
The accused’s application for a stay of proceedings 
under s. 24(1) was rejected. “A stay of proceedings, 
while available  as a remedy for Charter violations 
stemming from improper police conduct, is a 
drastic remedy reserved for the clearest of cases,” 
said Justice Kalmakoff. “If the misconduct does 
not, itself, impact on the fairness of the trial, in 
order to justify a stay of proceedings, it must be so 
egregious that the mere fact of going forward in 
light of it would be offensive. In this case, even 
though [the accused’s] Charter rights were 
breached, the conduct of the police officers does 
not come close to meeting that standard.”
Describing this case as a “close call”, the Court of 
Appeal declined to exclude the evidence even 
though there were breaches under ss. 8 and 9 of 
the Charter to consider in addition to the s. 10(a) 
breach identified by the trial judge. Although the 
impact of the breaches on the  accused’s Charter 
interests was significant, the Charter-offending 
police conduct fell at the lower end of the scale of 
seriousness. The police did not act capriciously, nor 
were their actions groundless. 
“In a dynamic and fluid situation, the conduct of 
the officers fell just short of reaching a legal 
standard that is not always easy to recognize,”  said 
the Appeal Court. Furthermore, the evidence 
obtained in connection with the breaches was 
highly reliable and essential for the prosecution of 
a serious offence in which there  was a significant 
public interest in an adjudication on the merits. The 
discovery of the cocaine in the  accused’s vehicle 
was admissible, his appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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COURT USED PRIOR REPORTED 
CASES INVOLVING OFFICERS IN 
ASSESSING REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
In R. v. Chapman, 2020 SKCA 11 the accused drew 
the trial judge’s attention to other previously 
decided cases involving the same officers. One of 
the officers was even questioned during cross-
examination about an earlier case in which he 
testified. The accused was using these prior cases to 
demonstrate the officers only had a reasonable 
suspicion when faced with similar information like 
they had in the Chapman case but took other 
investigative steps before making an arrest, 
something they did not do this time.  
The Court of Appeal found the earlier cases were 
not decisive in determining whether the officer had 
a reasonable belief in this case, but a court could 
cautiously consider an officer’s prior experiences 
and actions when deciding  whether the reasonable 
grounds threshold was met in the case currently 
under review:
To be clear, I do not reach [the conclusion that 
the objective criteria necessary to ground a 
reasonable belief fell short] simply because the 
evidence in this case was very similar to 
information upon which these officers based a 
suspicion in the past. ... [T]he assessment of 
whether the reasonable grounds to believe 
standard has been met in individual cases is 
heavily fact-driven. While the applicable legal 
standard must remain consistent in its 
interpretation, there will inevitably be 
quantitative and qualitative differences in the 
evidence that must be borne in mind when 
comparing cases side-by-side.
This means the manner in which an individual 
officer treated a previous case involving a 
similar constellation of observations is not 
necessar i ly determinat ive of whether 
reasonable grounds to believe existed in a 
subsequent case. While police officers are not 
invariably required, when deciding whether 
they have reasonable grounds to believe an 
offence has been committed, to recall past 
cases in which they acted on the basis of 
having a reasonable suspicion and ask 
themselves “Do I have more now than I had 
then?”, the court is entitled to consider the way 
past experiences and actions informed the 
choices the officer made in the case under 
review when deciding whether the requisite 
legal standard has been met.
By that same token, however, information that 
objectively grounded only a reasonable 
suspicion in a prior case does not rise to the 
level of objectively supporting a reasonable 
belief in a subsequent case just because the 
officer in possession of the information feels 
that he or she now knows more than he or she 
used to. Trial judges must be careful not to 
permit officer experience to override all other 
considerations.
All of this is not to be taken as meaning that 
police officers are required to proceed with a 
regimented step-by-step approach, carefully 
identifying when they have suspicion and then 
pausing to consider what additional steps need 
to be taken to cross the threshold to belief 
before making an arrest. Investigations, 
especially those that occur in the context of 
traffic stops, are dynamic events. They can 
unfold quickly and unpredictably; it is not an 
exact science. Sometimes the information 
available to the officer will be blatant and 
overwhelming. Other times, it will be subtle 
and nuanced. Every case is different. At some 
point, a police officer will always have to make 
a judgment call, which will fall to be examined 
against the reasonable grounds to believe 
standard.
This was not first the decision to consider an 
officer’s involvement in a  prior case. In R. v. 
Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248, the accused pointed to 
two other reported cases where the investigating 
officer was found to have exceeded his search 
powers. In both of these cases, evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The accused sought to use 
these prior cases to demonstrate bad faith (i.e. a 
pattern of the officer abusing his search authority). 
The Ontario Court of Appeal referenced these cases 
in finding the officer’s conduct fell at the serious 
end of the misconduct spectrum, which favoured 
the exclusion of evidence.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL DETENTION 
AROSE WHEN POLICE BOXED IN 
VEHICLE SO IT COULD NOT BE 
DRIVEN AWAY
R. v. Thompson, 2020 ONCA 264
Police responded to an anonymous 
tip that drug dealing was taking place 
behind a shopping plaza. The tip was 
vague and alleged that women were 
going to and from a vehicle. At 12:23 
a.m., two uniformed police officers drove their
marked cruisers to the back of the plaza. The only
car in the  area was a  Cadillac parked in a stall
facing the curb. The Cadillac was running and it
was occupied. Its windows were tinted. One officer
parked her police cruiser directly behind
the  Cadillac — about 11 feet away — effecting
blocking it from moving. A second officer parked
his car directly behind the other police cruiser. One
officer approached the Cadillac’s passenger’s side
and tapped on its window. When the female
passenger rolled down the window, the officer
smelled burnt marijuana. She shone her flashlight
into the car and within a minute saw a smoked
marihuana roach in the centre console. Meanwhile,
the other officer approached the driver’s side — its
window was already down — and smelled burnt
marihuana. When he shone his flashlight at the
driver, the accused’s head “popped up”.
Both occupants were asked for identification. The 
accused was also asked for the vehicle ownership 
documents. The accused — a black male — 
produced his  Ontario driver’s licence while the 
passenger verbally identified herself. Both were 
arrested for possessing a controlled substance — 
the marihuana roach. The accused was told to exit 
his car and he was patted down, a process taking 
about five  minutes. He was placed in a  police car 
and the Cadillac was searched. Some loose cash 
and a scale were discovered in the centre console 
and a backpack was found in the back seat. The 
backpack was searched and 29 grams of cocaine, 5 
grams of marijuana, 8 grams of hash oil, 12 grams 
of hash, and about $18,000 in cash were located. 
The accused was then arrested for possession for 
the purpose of trafficking, cautioned and advised of 
his right to counsel. He was subsequently charged 
with possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Both officers conceded that when they 
blocked the Cadillac with their cruisers 
they had no basis to believe that anyone 
in the  car had committed a criminal 
offence. The judge also accepted that the “generic” 
anonymous tip the police received “did not provide 
the police with any right to detain” the accused. 
Nevertheless, the judge ruled that the  accused had 
not been detained under s. 9 of the Charter at this 
point. The judge found the  accused was not aware 
of the police presence, much less the position of 
the police cruisers, until the officer was very close 
to the driver-side window and had shone his 
flashlight at him. Furthermore, the Cadillac’s 
occupants were sitting in the car with no 
immediate  plan to move. The encounter involved 
general neighbourhood policing. The police had 
not effectively taken control of the accused. Nor 
was the encounter  inherently  intimidating. It was 
brief, lasting less than a minute from when the 
accused noticed the flashlight to when he was 
arrested. And the accused was not a  young person. 
Finally, the judge noted it was safer for the police to 
park  directly behind the Cadillac to signal that the 
police were there rather than someone who might 
pose a threat.
As for the use of the flashlight resulting in the 
observation of the marihuana roach, the judge 
concluded this did not amount to a s. 8 Charter 
breach. The police were entitled to use a flashlight 
for their safety  and the safety of the vehicle’s 
occupants. And, since the accused’s arrest was 
lawful, the search of the Cadillac and backpack 
were lawful as an incident to arrest. 
The judge did find a s. 10(b) Charter violation. In 
his view, the accused should have been advised of 
his right to counsel and cautioned when he was 
placed in the police car. However, the judge 
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declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of 
the Charter. First, he found the evidence was not 
“obtained in a manner” that breached the Charter, 
since the evidence would have been obtained even 
if the  accused had been advised of his right to 
counsel immediately upon arrest. Thus, s. 24(2) of 
the Charter  was not  triggered. But, even if s. 24(2) 
did apply, the evidence was nevertheless 
admissible. Although the s. 10(b) breach was “fairly 
serious”, the  impact of the violation on the 
accused’s rights was minimal as he was not 
questioned before he was advised of his right to 
counsel. Moreover, the evidence was non-bodily 
physical evidence that was reliable and essential to 
the Crown’s case. The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing he was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of 
the Charter. In his view, he was 
psychologically detained when the first police car 
was parked behind his Cadillac because  the police 
removed his choice to drive away. He also 
contended that the trial judge applied a  subjective 
approach — what was in the accused’s mind only 
— rather than an objective approach to the police 
encounter. He suggested a reasonable person in his 
shoes would not believe they were free to leave 
after the police obstructed their car. Finally, he 
asserted the evidence ought to have been excluded 
under s. 24(2)
Arbitrary Detention?
In deciding whether the accused was arbitrarily 
detained, Justice Jamal, for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, reviewed some of the general principles 
applicable in determining whether a  person is 
“detained” under s. 9 of the Charter:
• An inquiry under s. 9 involves two questions.
First, was the claimant detained? Second, was
any detention arbitrary?
• The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a
generous and purposive interpretation of s. 9,
one that seeks to balance society’s interest in
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Detention
1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter refers to a suspension of the 
individual’s liberty interest by a 
significant physical or psychological 
restraint. Psychological detention is 
established either where the individual has a legal 
obligation to comply with the restrictive request or 
demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the state conduct that he or she had no 
choice but to comply.
2. In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal 
obligation, it may not be clear whether a person has 
been detained. To determine whether the reasonable 
person in the individual’s circumstances would 
conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state 
of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter 
alia, the following factors:
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as 
they would reasonably be perceived by the 
individual: whether the police were providing 
general assistance; maintaining general order; 
making general inquiries regarding a particular 
occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct, including the 
language used; the use of physical contact; the 
place where the interaction occurred; the 
presence of others; and the duration of the 
encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of 
the individual where relevant, including age; 
physical stature; minority status; level of 
sophistication.
Supreme Court of Canada, per the majority in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para. 44. underlining added.
 
 
  
   
    
  

   




 
 


       

 

 
 

        
  
  
 
 
 

  
          

 
 
 
    

         

 
 
        


 
 
 
 
  
      
         
          
            
      
         
               
         
               
            
                   
       
              
  
            
           
            
          
                
    
       
        
  
  


      

        
 


 
         
        
 
  

    

w w.10-8.ca
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effective policing with robust protection for 
constitutional rights
• The purpose of s. 9, broadly stated, is to protect
individual liberty against unjustified state
interference. This liberty includes an individual’s
right to make an informed choice  about whether
to interact with the police or to simply walk
away. If the police have removed an individual’s
choice to leave, the individual is detained.
• A detention occurs where the individual has
been taken “into the effective control of the
state  authorities”. At this point, the individual’s
liberty has been “meaningfully constrained”,
and the individual has a “genuine need of the
additional rights accorded by the Charter to
people in that situation”. These  rights include
the right to be informed of the  reasons for the
detention (s. 10(a)); the right to retain and
instruct counsel without delay and to be
informed of that right (s. 10(b)); and the right to
have the  validity of the detention determined by
way of habeas corpus and to be released if the
detention is not lawful (s. 10(c)).
• [N]ot every trivial or insignificant interference
with individual liberty attracts Charter scrutiny
under s. 9. Such a broad interpretation would
“trivialize the applicable Charter rights and
overshoot their purpose”. The police may, as a
result, interact with or even delay members of
the public, without necessarily prompting a
“detention” under ss. 9 or 10(b). Instead, a
“detention” arises only where the police have
suspended an individual’s liberty interest
through “a significant physical or psychological 
restraint”.
• Physical restraint has been called “the paradigm
form of detention”, with arrest being the
“paradigm form of physical restraint”.
• [A] detention can also arise from psychological
restraint. This is because police conduct “short
of holding an individual behind bars or in
handcuffs can be coercive enough to engage the
rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter”.
• A psychological detention can arise either if: (1)
an individual is legally required to comply with a
police direction or demand (as with a demand
for a roadside breath sample); or (2) absent
actual legal compulsion, “the police conduct
would cause a reasonable person to conclude
that he or she was not free  to go and had to
comply with the police direction or demand”.
This involves “an objective determination, made
in light of the circumstances of an encounter as
a whole”. [references omitted, paras. 28-36]
Was there a Psychological Detention?
The Court of Appeal reviewed the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s framework for determining  whether a 
psychological detention occurred — absent 
physical restraint or a legal obligation to comply 
with a police direction or demand — and 
concluded that the accused was detained prior to 
his arrest. Justice Jamal found the trial judge erred 
in unduly focussing on what was in the  accused’s 
mind rather than on how the police behaved and 
how the police behaviour could be reasonably 
perceived. 
The trial judge erroneously emphasized that the 
accused was not subjectively aware that the police 
had parked behind him until they shone a flashlight 
into his car. The trial judge also inferred that the 
“A psychological detention can arise either if: (1) an individual is legally required 
to comply with a police direction or demand (as with a demand for a roadside 
breath sample); or (2) absent actual legal compulsion, ‘the police conduct would 
cause a reasonable person to conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to 
comply with the police direction or demand’.”
“An inquiry under s. 9 involves 
two questions. First, was the 
claimant detained? Second, was 
any detention arbitrary?”
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accused had no subjective intention to drive away 
when the police arrived. “[The judge] conducted a 
largely subjective inquiry into the [accused’s] state 
of mind during the encounter, rather than an 
objective inquiry about whether the police 
conduct would cause a reasonable person in the 
[accused’s] circumstances to conclude that he was 
free to leave,”  said Justice Jamal. “Whether the 
[accused] was detained, triggering the police’s 
Charter obligations, should not turn on whether 
the [accused] saw the police in his rear-view 
mirror as they boxed him in (a subjective 
approach), but on whether a reasonable person in 
his circumstances would conclude that this police 
conduct effected a detention (an objective 
approach).”  The correct question was not whether 
the accused intended to drive away. Rather, it was 
whether objectively the police had taken away his 
choice to do so. 
An objective approach to detention is important for 
three reasons:
1. It allows the police to know when the
detention occurs, based on their own conduct
rather than the subjective perceptions of the
accused;
2. It maintains the rule of law, as all claims are
subjected to the same standard, avoiding a
different result if, for example, one accused
saw the police in his rear-view mirror as they
obstructed his car, but another did not; and
3. It recognizes that some individuals are
incapable of forming subjective perceptions,
like the [accused] here, who did not appear to
immediately perceive when the police
obstructed his car.
In applying the objective approach to detention — 
the circumstances giving rise to the encounter, the 
nature of the police conduct and the characteristics 
and circumstances of the accused — the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the accused was detained 
the moment the first police cruiser boxed in his car. 
At this point, the accused’s choice to drive away 
was eliminated unless and until the police decided 
otherwise.
The circumstances giving rise to the 
encounter 
The police were responding to a general, 
anonymous tip. When the police responded and 
found the car in the parking lot late  at night with its 
engine running, this could be seen as “general 
neighbourhood policing”. However, once the 
police obstructed the accused’s car, things changed. 
“A reasonable person would know only that the 
police  showed up late at night and for no apparent 
reason obstructed the [accused’s] car,” said Justice 
Jamal. “Regardless of the officers’ intentions as 
they blocked the  [accused], a  reasonable  person 
would not perceive this action as ‘assisting in 
meeting needs or maintaining basic order’.” 
The nature of the police conduct 
“The police conduct was authoritative from the 
outset,” said Justice Jamal. “By obstructing the 
movement of the [accused’s] car, the police would 
reasonably be perceived as sending the message 
that the [accused] was not free to leave until the 
police  decided otherwise.” Other circumstances of 
the encounter included:
• the police were uniformed and in marked
police cars;
• they placed themselves on either side  of the
car to question the occupants;
• they looked into the  car with flashlights and
directed the passenger to roll down her
window; and
• they directed the occupants to produce
identification and vehicle ownership
documents.
“[A] detention can also arise from psychological restraint. This is because police 
conduct ‘short of holding an individual behind bars or in handcuffs can be 
coercive enough to engage the rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter’.”
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The character of the encounter moved from 
“general neighbourhood policing” to the police 
effectively  taking control of the accused. The  police 
obstructed the accused’s car, approached it and 
sought information from its occupants. Although 
the encounter was brief, “a psychological 
detention can occur at the start of an interaction 
or within seconds.” “In my view, most reasonable 
people would find it intimidating to have their 
car’s movement obstructed by two police cruisers,” 
said Justice  Jamal. Moreover, the Crown did not 
provide any authority to justify the legality of the 
detention, such as Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act or 
the Criminal Code. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Crown’s 
submission that the accused was not detained 
because  he could have walked away. “In my view, 
a reasonable  person in the [accused’s] position, 
whose  car was deliberately obstructed by a police 
cruiser, would conclude that they were not free to 
leave, on foot or otherwise,”  said Justice Jamal. 
“But even if the [accused] was free to leave on 
foot, as the Crown asserts, this confirms that his 
freedom of movement was s ignif icant ly 
constrained. If the individual is a motorist or a 
driver, their freedom of movement includes the 
freedom to leave  by driving away. Here, the 
[accused’s] freedom to drive away was significantly 
constrained, which suggests that he was detained.”
The characteristics of the accused 
Although there was no suggestion of racial profiling 
by police, the accused’s status as a racialized 
Canadian — a black man — was relevant to the 
perception of a reasonable person in his shoes.
Was the Detention Arbitrary?
At trial and on appeal the Crown conceded that the 
police lacked reasonable grounds to detain the 
accused. A detention without at least reasonable 
suspicion is unlawful. And the Crown did not seek 
to justify the accused’s detention on any other 
basis. Therefore, the accused’s detention was 
arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter. 
s. 10(b) Right to Counsel
“When an individual is arrested or detained, s. 
10(b) of the Charter guarantees the individual the 
right to retain and instruct counsel “without 
delay” and to be informed of that right,” said 
Jutsice Jamal. “Subject to concerns for officer or 
public safety, or limitations prescribed by law and 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter, ‘without delay’ 
means ‘immediately’.”
In this case, the trial judge held that the police did 
not inform the accused of his right to counsel 
immediately upon arrest. However, the only delay 
“Allowing a peace officer to serve a notice of 24-hour driving prohibition at the 
police detachment furthers the purpose of s. 215(3)(b), allows peace officers’ 
duties under the MVA and the Criminal Code to dovetail, and avoids absurd 
consequences. In giving [the driver] a 24-hour driving prohibition at the police 
detachment, [the officer] implicitly decided that he had the authority to do so.” 
TIMELINE
12:23 a.m. Police arrive and park behind accused’s 
car.
12:26 a.m. Police arrest accused.
12:26 a.m. to 
12:33 a.m.
Police conduct pat-down search of 
accused and place him in the back of 
the police car.
12:33 a.m. to 
12:41 a.m.
Police search the accused’s car 
incident to arrest.
12:44 a.m. Police inform the accused of his right to 
counsel.
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attributed to the s. 10(b) breach by the trial judge 
was when the police searched the accused’s car. 
The Court of Appeal found this to be  an error since 
the trial judge failed to find the accused was 
actually detained when the police parked behind 
his car. But it was unnecessary to decide whether 
the police were justified in postponing advising the 
accused of his right to counsel until they patted 
him down. The police should have at least advised 
the accused of his s. 10(b) rights when they placed 
him in the back of the police cruiser. They provided 
no reason for delaying the s. 10(b) advisement 
before they searched his car. Instead they waited 
another 11 minutes before doing so. 
s. 24(2) Charter
Since the Court of Appeal found two Charter 
breaches — s. 9 and s. 10(b) — a new s. 24(2) 
Charter analysis was required. Here, the evidence 
was obtained in manner that breached both these 
rights. Although there was no causal connection 
between the the s. 10(b) violation and the discovery 
of the evidence, the Crown conceded there was a 
temporal connection sufficient to trigger s. 24(2). 
The breach and discovery were close in time and 
part of the same transaction. “A temporal 
connection between the breach of a Charter right 
and the discovery of evidence  is enough to engage 
s. 24(2),” said Justice Jamal. “Here, there was such
a connection between the breach of s.  10(b) and
the discovery of the evidence.” In addition, there
was also a causal connection between the
discovery of the evidence and the arbitrary
detention. “The arbitrary detention had a direct
causal connection to the discovery of the
marijuana roach, and then to the arrest of the 
[accused], the search of his car, and the discovery 
of the evidence,” Justice Jamal said. 
After balancing the s. 24(2) factors in the 
admissibility analysis — the seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the 
breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests 
and society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
on the merits — the Court of Appeal excluded the 
evidence. The seriousness of the police misconduct 
and the  impact of the breaches on the accused 
pulled in favour of exclusion, which could not be 
outweighed by society’s interest in an adjudication 
of the case on its merits. Since the evidence was 
excluded on the basis of the ss. 9 and 10(b) 
breaches, the Court of Appeal found no reason to 
address an alleged illegal search of the accused’s 
car under s. 8.
An Institutional and Systemic Breach
One of the main factors favouring exclusion of the 
evidence in this case was the recognition that the s. 
10(b) breach reflected an institutional or systemic 
problem. One officer testified her obligation to 
inform the  accused of his right to counsel was “as 
soon as possible” which meant “if it’s convenient 
for [her] to give rights to counsel and practical.” 
The other officer testified that the accused had to 
be informed of his right to counsel “as soon as 
practicable”. He said he was taught this at his 
initial training and as part of ongoing training.  The 
Court of Appeal noted that “as soon as practicable” 
was a laxer standard from what s. 10(b) mandated. 
And, as the trial judge  found, this belief that the 
right to counsel need only be given “as soon as 
practicable” highlighted a “chronic 
problem” with the police service  in 
systematically delaying the right to 
counsel. 
The trial judge even referred to an earlier 
court decision from 2017 where another 
judge had found the police service had 
failed to understand the immediacy 
requirement of the s. 10(b) right or they 
were unwilling to follow it. Moreover, 
Charter of Rights
s. 10(b) Everyone has the right
on arrest or detention ... (b) to
retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be 
informed of that right ... 
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another court decision in 2014 found that the same 
police service, “as an institution [,] failed to equip 
its officers with the knowledge required of a 
reasonably  trained police  officer”  with respect to s. 
10(b) Charter  rights being provided immediately 
upon an investigative detention. This systemic 
problem at the time was held to make the breach 
more serious. 
The Court of Appeal noted that since 2017 there 
have been even more instances of this police 
service failing to respect their obligation to inform a 
detainee of their right to counsel immediately. This, 
it found, underscored an ongoing systemic 
problem. So, even though the two officers in this 
case  did not appear to intentionally breach s. 10(b), 
were relatively inexperienced and appeared to be 
following their training, the institutional and 
systemic breach of clear and well-settled 
constitutional obligations under s. 10(b)  served as 
an aggravating factor supporting exclusion of the 
evidence in this case. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded under s. 24(2), his conviction was set 
aside and an acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
s. 24(2) ANALYSIS 
s. 24(2) factors s.9 breach s. 10(b) breach
Seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing 
state conduct
• moderately serious.
• negligence rather than wilful or 
deliberate misconduct.
• police appeared to be unaware that their 
actions constituted or might constitute a
detention.
• more serious
• police waited without justification 
before advising accused of right to
counsel
• officers appeared confused about 
their obligations under s. 10(b).
• the breach was rooted in an 
institutional and  systemic police
disregard for their constitutional 
obligations.
Impact of the breach 
on the accused’s 
Charter-protected 
interests
• significant.
• being obstructed by a police car without 
justification curtailed his expectation of
liberty.
• heightened by the lack of any reasonable
basis for detention.
• minimal since police did not try to 
question the accused before advising 
him of his right to counsel and he 
made no inculpatory comments.
Society’s interest in 
the adjudication of 
the case on its merits
• evidence was reliable and essential to the
Crown’s case.
• evidence was reliable and essential to
the Crown’s case.
Source: R. v. Thompson, 2020 ONCA 264  
We are interested in your feedback about the newsletter. Submit a comment here.
Volume 20 Issue 2 ~ March/April 2020
PAGE 37
“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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2020 British Columbia 
Law Enforcement Memorial 
In 1998 the Government of Canada proclaimed the last Sunday in September as Police & Peace Officers’ 
National Memorial Day. On this day every year Canadians are given an opportunity to formally express 
appreciation for the dedication of Law Enforcement Officers who make the ultimate, tragic sacrifice to 
keep communities safe. 
Sunday, September 27, 2020 at 1:00 pm 
Ceremony at the BC Legislature in Victoria, BC 
Law Enforcement participants to form up in the 800 block of Government Street at 12:00 pm. 
For complete events information including annual Memorial Golf Tournament, Ride to Remember 
and Run to Remember visit our website at http://www.bclem.ca 
or 
For details specific to your agency, contact your Ceremonial Sergeant Major 
Follow us on: 
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UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES 
August 5 - September 16, 2020
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
June 9-12, 2020
Conducting Internal Investigations (INVE-1011)
June 22-23, 2020
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)
June 24-26, 2020
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1000)
July 13-17, 2020
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
August 8-22 (3 Saturdays)
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001)
August 24-28, 2020
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
June 15-17, 2020
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement 
Skills Certificate, an academic credential 
that can help you pursue or advance your in 
the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have 
completed the requirements for the 
certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For 
more information, visit the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate 
webpage.
Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
View the full 2020 Course Calendar online.
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Emergency Management Certificate
program now fully online
Accelerated online program allows completion within 3 months. Face-
to-face courses now available through online delivery
In our current environment, leaders need people with emergency management knowledge
and skills to help them meet their organization’s health, safety and business continuity
needs.
To meet this demand, the JIBC Emergency Management Division is offering the Emergency
Management Certificate program in an accelerated, fully online delivery format.
Courses in the program that were previously offered face-to-face have transitioned to online
delivery. The schedule of the program has also been updated to allow students to complete
all the required courses in three months.
Gain the Skills to Respond Effectively in a Critical Situation
Through the program, you will gain a solid foundation in emergency management concepts
and practices you can apply right away. You will learn essential skills such as:
how to create emergency management plans; 
how to develop a business continuity plan;  
how to set up an effective Emergency Operations Centre; and
how to conduct hazard, risk, and vulnerability analyses (HRVA).
Each course in the program is there to provide the knowledge and skills that can help your
organization respond effectively during a critical situation.
If you have questions, send them via email to emergency@jibc.ca. 
Apply Now
Forward to a Friend
ACCELERATED PROGRAM SCHEDULE
Check out the course schedule for the
Accelerated Emergency Management
Certificate program that allows students to
complete the program in three months.
UPDATED CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
SCHEDULE
Additional online offerings have been added
to the Emergency Management Certificate
program. View the latest schedule on the
program webpage.
Customized Contract
Training
EMD can customize any of our
training to meet the unique
needs and challenges your
organization or community may
have. Contact us at
emergency@jibc.ca for more
information.
Scholarships, Awards &
Bursaries
JIBC offers a number of awards,
bursaries and scholarships. To
browse the full list of available
options, criteria and deadlines,
visit the JIBC Financial Aid
website
Sign Up To JIBC Mailing
Lists
Stay up to date with the latest
course offerings at JIBC and
subscribe to our personalized
email lists. You can update your
preferences or unsubscribe at
any time.
Justice Institute of British Columbia
715 McBride Boulevard
New Westminster, BC V3L 5T4 Canada
You are receiving this email because you have taken courses that are part of the Emergency Management Certificate program
or are signed up to our Emergency Management mailing list. To update your preferences, please click the link below.
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[PROGRAM UPDATE] JIBC now offering accelerated, fully online Emergency Management Certificate program
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